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CAREN MYERS MORRISON* 
 Peremptory challenges enable litigants to remove otherwise 
qualified prospective jurors from the jury panel without any showing of 
cause, and accordingly, are often exercised on the basis of race.  In Batson 
v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court tried to remedy the most obvious abuses by 
requiring that strike proponents give a “race neutral” reason for their 
strikes and directing trial courts to assess the credibility of the explanation.  
But the Batson regime has proved spectacularly unsuccessful.  It has not 
ended racial discrimination in jury selection, nor does it adequately 
safeguard the rights of the excluded jurors. 
 One of the reasons for this failure is that the Batson framework rests 
on psychologically naïve theories of human behavior.  These are that (1) 
considerations of race can be purged from the jury selection process, (2) 
lawyers will be aware of their motivations for striking particular jurors and 
will report these reasons honestly, and (3) judges will be able to distinguish 
between honest and dishonest explanations.  But these theories are 
inconsistent with recent advances in cognitive psychology, which suggest 
instead that most of us retain implicit biases against racial minorities, even 
when we believe that we are unbiased.  
 If implicit bias is indeed a pervasive fact, then we need to find 
effective ways to prevent it from dictating outcomes.  I therefore propose 
that we jettison the inherently unstable framework of Batson and allow 
peremptory challenges only on consent of both parties with the challenges 
waived if no agreement is reached.  The benefits of this proposal would be 
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similar to abolition of the peremptory challenge: less litigation, a more 
robust safeguard against racial discrimination, and potentially broader 
participation by prospective jurors.  But because this proposal retains the 
use of peremptory challenges on consent, it would better preserve party  
autonomy and the acceptability of verdicts.  Ultimately, negotiating 
peremptory challenges could protect the rights of the excluded jurors, 
preserve the original benefits of the peremptory challenge, and maintain the 
dignity of all participants. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“[I]n criminal cases, or at least in capital ones, there is, in favorem vitae, allowed to the 
prisoner an arbitrary and capricious species of challenge to a certain number of jurors, 
without sh[o]wing any cause at all; which is called a peremptory challenge: a provision full 
of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners, for which our English laws are justly famous.” 
—William Blackstone1 
  
Of all the contests of wit and will involved in trial practice, none are as 
fraught as jury selection.  If the trial—the impassioned closing argument or 
the devastating cross-examination—has pride of place in public mythology, 
jury selection holds that honor among lawyers.  Sometimes said to 
determine the outcome of a trial even before the first witness is sworn,2 it is 
a procedure regarded with a peculiar blend of reverence and suspicion.  It 
can consume weeks of court time and hundreds of thousands of dollars of 
consultant fees.  But the primary source of ambivalence about jury selection 
coalesces around the peremptory challenge and the complicated, 
counterintuitive scaffolding we have erected around it to prevent its misuse. 
Peremptory challenges, also known as peremptory strikes, enable 
litigants to remove otherwise qualified prospective jurors from their jury 
panel without any showing of cause.  Empirical study—consonant with 
common intuition—has long revealed that both prosecutors and defense 
counsel use peremptory challenges to rid the jury of the types of jurors they 
find most threatening, and that these types correlate with age, gender, and 
particularly, race.3  This means that not only do nonwhite defendants 
frequently have to face trial without any of their peers on their jury but also 
that substantial numbers of citizens, who have survived challenges for cause 
only to be summarily dismissed, are denied the opportunity to participate in 
an important aspect of civic life. 
 
1 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353.  “In favorem vitae” means “in favor of 
life”; presumably the peremptory challenge at its inception was a means of mitigating the 
death penalty, the standard punishment for most felonies in eighteenth century England.  See 
JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 6, 334 (2003) (noting how 
the English “Bloody Code” overprescribed capital punishment, including for property 
offenses). 
2 Jeffrey Abramson notes the famous quip about the difference between trials in England, 
which abolished peremptory challenges twenty-five years ago, and trials in the United 
States: “[I]n England, the trial starts when jury selection is over; in the United States, the 
trial is already over.”  JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL 
OF DEMOCRACY 143 (1994); see also Herald P. Fahringer, In the Valley of the Blind: A 
Primer on Jury Selection in a Criminal Case, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 116, 116 (1980) 
(“In most cases, the defendant’s fate is fixed after jury selection.”). 
3 See David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder 
Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 51–69 (2001). 
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The framework established by the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in 
Batson v. Kentucky and its progeny tried to remedy the most obvious abuses 
of the peremptory challenge based on race, and later, gender.4  The Court 
thus required that strike proponents give a “race neutral” reason for the 
strike and directed the trial courts to assess the credibility of the 
explanation.  But the Batson regime has proved largely unsuccessful.  
Lawyers are often inhibited from raising Batson claims for fear of 
antagonizing their opponent or the judge, and judges are inhibited from 
granting Batson motions because of the implied judgment that the strike’s 
proponent is either a racist, a liar, or both.  The requirement of a race-
neutral explanation for peremptory strikes has not ended racial 
discrimination in jury selection, nor does it adequately safeguard the rights 
of the excluded jurors.  And it is embarrassing to everyone because it is a 
pretense—everyone is forced to assert, under pains of violating the 
Constitution, that race was not a factor in their decisions. 
While the Batson framework relies on apparently commonsense 
assumptions about human behavior, these assumptions are contrary to what 
we know about human mental processes and the influence of race on 
decisionmaking.5  The behavioral theories that seem to undergird Batson 
are that (1) considerations of race can be purged from the jury selection 
process, (2) lawyers will be aware of their motivations for striking 
particular jurors and will report these reasons honestly, and (3) judges will 
be able to distinguish between honest and dishonest explanations.6  But 
these theories are inconsistent with recent advances in cognitive social 
psychology.  While long suspected, there is now substantial empirical 
evidence that most of us labor under some amount of implicit bias against 
racial minorities, even when we believe ourselves to be unbiased.7  The 
 
4 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97–98 (1986) (holding that the Equal Protection 
Clause forbids racial discrimination in the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges).  The 
cases that followed extended Batson’s protection to gender.  See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. 
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130–31 (1994) (extending constitutional protection to strikes based on 
gender).  In view of history and the focus of social psychological research, I will focus 
primarily in this Article on the effects of peremptory challenges on African-Americans. 
5 See Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment 
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1006 (2006) 
(“When subjected to empirical scrutiny, ‘common sense’ theories of how people perceive and 
judge themselves and others in their social environment often turn out to be wrong.”). 
6 See Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory 
Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099, 1104–05 (1994) (“[T]hose who 
want to discriminate will know enough to conceal their intent, and the Court has failed to 
explain how that intent is to be divined, leaving trial judges by and large to hew to the 
tradition of arbitrary strikes and allow peremptory challenges in doubtful cases.”). 
7 See Nilanjana Dasgupta et al., Automatic Preference for White Americans: Eliminating 
the Familiarity Explanation, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 316, 316–17 (2000) (noting 
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Batson framework operates as if implicit bias barely exists when it almost 
certainly is a significant factor in jury selection and one that is not amenable 
to self-report.  It is time to subject Batson to behavioral realism—the 
demand “that the law account for the most accurate model of human 
thought, decisionmaking, and action provided by the sciences.”8 
There has been no shortage of proposals aimed at remedying racial 
discrimination in jury selection, ranging from “affirmative strikes” to 
establishing racial quotas on trial juries.9  Ultimately, the most effective 
alternative to Batson would also be the simplest: the abolition of 
peremptory challenges.  Proponents argue that eliminating the challenge 
would put an end to invidious discrimination, cut down on wasteful 
litigation, and free lawyers from the contortions of trying to deny all 
influence of race on their decisionmaking.10  But abolition presents two 
problems.  First, however compelling the arguments, they cannot override 
one simple truth: American lawyers like peremptory challenges.  Many 
litigators view peremptory challenges as essential tools for sculpting a jury 
that will give them and their clients the most favorable audience.  As one 
former litigator has observed, trial lawyers “would sooner dispense with a 
few amendments to the Constitution than give up peremptory challenges.”11  
Accordingly, no U.S. jurisdiction has ever eliminated peremptory 
challenges.12  Second, there is an intrinsic value to the peremptory challenge 
that would be lost if it were eliminated.  Peremptory challenges allow 
litigants to participate in the creation of the factfinder, free from 
interference by courts.  This value of autonomy should not be lightly 
discarded. 
 
research suggesting that despite a decline in overt racism, “subtle and implicit forms of 
prejudice and discrimination remain pervasive”); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton 
Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 966 (2006) (concluding 
that “a substantial and actively accumulating body of research evidence establishes that implicit 
race bias is pervasive and is associated with discrimination against African Americans”); 
Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-
esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 5–6 (1995) (noting that unconscious or 
automatic operation of stereotypes often escapes introspective notice); Anthony G. Greenwald 
et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1465 (1998) (identifying implicit attitudes and 
associations “which might be expected for White subjects raised in a culture imbued with 
pervasive residues of a history of anti-Black discrimination”). 
8 Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 
58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 468 (2010). 
9 See infra Part I.D.1. 
10 See infra Part II.B. 
11 Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges: Lawyers Are from Mars, Judges Are 
from Venus, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 135, 136 (2000). 
12 To the contrary, every U.S. jurisdiction provides for peremptory challenges.  See infra 
note 23 and accompanying text. 
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So we find ourselves at an impasse.  We can keep tinkering with the 
formula.  We can keep issuing impassioned, but doomed, calls for abolition.  
Or we can recognize that jury selection, at the discretionary, peremptory 
challenge stage, simply should not be constitutionalized.  It may be time to 
admit that the Batson experiment has failed because stereotyping in some 
form is the essence of jury selection.13  But that does not mean we need to 
revert to the bad, old days of institutionalized racism, where many 
prosecutors’ offices had policies of systematically purging jury panels of 
African-American jurors.14  Instead, we should consider a different 
approach for using peremptory challenges: that they be allowed only on 
consent. 
If implicit bias is indeed a pervasive fact, the question then becomes 
how to prevent it from dictating outcomes in a discriminatory way.  Having 
parties swear that no considerations of race entered their minds in deciding 
which jurors to strike does not provide the moral message we think it does.  
Instead of sending a clear signal that racial discrimination will not be 
tolerated, the Batson hearing is usually a far more degrading exercise and 
one that does not prevent minorities from being summarily excluded from 
jury service.  When explanations such as “he looks like a drug dealer to 
me”15 are accepted as “race neutral,” the message is effective tolerance of 
racial bias. 
Drawing on empirical studies, psychological research, and the 
emerging school of behavioral realism, I suggest that courts should abandon 
the failed constitutional experiment of trying to divine attorney intent.  
Social science research strongly suggests that such an undertaking is futile 
and only encourages specious explanations.  Instead, we should focus on 
what really matters: increasing the opportunities for all Americans to 
participate in jury service, allowing defendants a greater chance to have 
 
13 See Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and 
Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 447 (1996) (“[E]valuating people on 
the basis of stereotypes is an inherent aspect of the peremptory challenge system.”). 
14 Throughout this Article, I will use the terms “African-American” and “black” 
interchangeably.  When referring to all racial and ethnic groups other than the dominant 
majority, I will use the term “nonwhite” or “minority.” 
15 State v. Crawford, 873 So. 2d 768, 780, 783–84 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming trial 
court’s finding of race-neutrality in a strike where prosecutor stated, “I don’t like the way 
he’s dressed.  He looks like a drug dealer to me”); see also Jackson v. State, 5 So. 3d 1144, 
1149–50 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming trial court’s finding of race-neutrality in a strike 
where a prosecutor explained that a juror was “inattentive” and “had dyed-red hair”); State v. 
Tyler, No. M2005–00500–CCA–R3–CD, 2006 WL 264631, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 1, 
2006) (affirming ruling of race-neutrality where prosecutor explained a strike used on a 
black juror on the ground that she “had a hat on, kind of a large white hat, with sunglasses 
on” and “would have brought some attention to herself”). 
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peers on their jury,16 and protecting the dignity of all participants, litigants 
and prospective jurors alike.  We should therefore jettison the procedurally 
unwieldy, inherently unstable world of Batson and replace it with a system 
in which the parties could determine which prospective jurors should be 
challenged through negotiation. 
Under this proposal, voir dire would proceed as usual.17  Lawyers 
would raise any challenges for cause, on which the court would rule.  Then, 
each side would be presented with a panel of twelve qualified, impartial 
jurors.  But instead of each side only conferring with her client or co-
counsel to decide which jurors to strike peremptorily, the adversaries would 
confer with each other.  Neither party would have exclusive power to 
decide, and any strikes would be the product of mutual consent.  If the 
parties agreed to a shortlist of jurors to strike, they would then present their 
choices to the court.  The struck jurors would not know which side had 
struck them or if the strike was the product of a joint decision.  The lawyers 
would not have to make excuses for their actions.  If the parties failed to 
reach an agreement, they would end up with the first twelve jurors on the 
panel.  Abolition, therefore, would be the default position, the price to pay 
if the parties failed to come to terms in any given case. 
While negotiation may seem to be a counterintuitive solution to the 
problems raised by peremptory challenges, it is closer to a challenge-based 
system than might initially be apparent.  Notwithstanding the juror-centered 
conception of rights promoted by the Batson line of cases, enforcement of 
these rights is largely a matter of adversarial preference.  While judges have 
the authority to raise Batson objections sua sponte, they appear to exercise 
this power extremely rarely.18  So whether a peremptory strike is subject to 
 
16 Jury diversity may in fact be significant to trial outcomes in a substantial number of 
cases.  A recent empirical study found statistically significant disparities in outcome between 
juries selected from all-white jury pools and juries selected from racially mixed pools.  See 
Shamena Anwar et al., The Impact of Jury Race in Criminal Trials, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1017, 
1019–20 (2012). 
17 None of this is intended to argue for a reduced or limited voir dire.  The most 
persuasive arguments made in this sphere are for more detailed, individualized voir dire, 
precisely so that the lawyers have something other than stereotypes upon which to base their 
decisions.  See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, Avoid Bald Men and People with 
Green Socks? Other Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process in Jury Selection, 78 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 1179, 1198–1201 (2003) (arguing for expanded, individualized voir dire). 
18 See People v. Rivera, 852 N.E.2d 771, 785 (Ill. 2006) (holding that “a trial court has 
the authority to raise a Batson issue sua sponte in appropriate circumstances”), aff’d Rivera 
v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 1456 (2009); State v. Mootz, 808 N.W.2d 207, 217 (Iowa 2012) 
(“While we recognize a trial court may raise the issue of purposeful racial discrimination sua 
sponte, like other jurisdictions to consider this issue, we will also insist upon a clear 
indication of a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination before trial courts are 
authorized to act.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).  However, the Illinois 
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the Batson analysis in the first place is typically dependent on attorney 
choice.19  Negotiation just provides another means of expressing party 
preferences. 
Some of the benefits of this proposal would be similar to those gained 
by eliminating the peremptory challenge: less litigation, a more robust 
safeguard against racial discrimination, and potentially broader participation 
by prospective jurors.  But unlike simply eliminating peremptory 
challenges, negotiation would better preserve party autonomy and the 
acceptability of verdicts by maintaining some ability of the parties to sculpt 
a jury of their own choosing. 
Part I of this Article briefly sketches the history of the peremptory 
challenge and the theoretical and practical justifications for its use.  It 
argues that, of all the reasons given in support of the peremptory challenge, 
the only justification that is specific to the peremptory challenge, as 
opposed to the challenge for cause, is party autonomy and independence 
from the court.  This Part details how the Batson regime changed, in some 
important ways, the nature of the peremptory challenge and infringed on the 
most justifiable reason for its existence. 
Part II reviews the reasons why an alternative to the Batson structure is 
desirable, even necessary.  This Part considers the claims in the literature 
and by practitioners and judges that the Batson framework is not effective 
at eradicating racial discrimination and examines some of the reasons why 
this is so.  It argues that the Batson line of cases fundamentally 
misunderstood attorneys’ motivations and rested its entire framework on 
unsupported assumptions about human behavior.  As the most recent 
cognitive science points in just the opposite direction, this Part contends 
that the Batson doctrine needs to come to terms with empirical reality. 
Part III outlines the proposal of negotiating peremptory challenges in 
more detail and explores the ways in which negotiation would provide a 
more robust shield against discrimination, protect the original purposes of 
the peremptory challenge, and preserve the dignity of the court and the 
 
Supreme Court in Rivera added that the “prima facie case of discrimination must be 
abundantly clear before a trial court acts sua sponte.”  852 N.E.2d at 785.  In addition, at 
least some courts frown upon judges raising Batson claims sua sponte.  See, e.g., Aki-
Khuam v. Davis, 339 F.3d 521, 527 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he voir dire process is still an 
adversarial one and the case law, including Batson and the cases that followed it, make it 
clear that Batson issues must be raised.  Batson is not self-executing.” (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted)); Doe v. Burnham, 6 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Under 
Batson, a court should at least wait for an objection before intervening in the process of jury 
selection to set aside a peremptory challenge. . . .  Judges should invade a party’s discretion 
to strike potential jurors only in narrow circumstances.” (citation omitted)). 
19 Many lawyers are reluctant to raise Batson claims, lest they draw their own Batson 
objections in response.  See infra notes 133–35 and accompanying text. 
2014] NEGOTIATING PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 9 
participants.  This Part considers the potential doctrinal and practical 
critiques of the proposal, particularly the concerns that the proposal would 
not protect the rights of the absent jurors, that it would enable lawyers to 
engage in collusion, and that it would unfairly benefit the defense.  The 
Article concludes that, despite certain inevitable shortcomings, negotiating 
peremptory challenges would be a significant improvement over our current 
regime. 
I. THE CONTESTED FUNCTION OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE 
The process of jury selection involves two related but distinct 
inquiries: a search for qualified jurors and a shaping of the jury through 
peremptory challenges.20  To begin, prospective jurors are questioned in a 
process known as voir dire.21  If a prospective juror appears to have 
prejudged the case or seems biased for any reason, she can be challenged 
for cause, and that motion will be ruled on by the court.22  In addition, the 
parties may exercise a set number of peremptory challenges and remove 
any jurors without cause.23  The twelve24 who remain, not counting any 
alternate jurors, are then sworn and become the trial jury.  This Part 
considers the historical origins of the peremptory challenge, the 
justifications for this practice in the modern justice system, and how its 
complexion has been transformed by Batson and its progeny. 
 
20 Jury selection procedures are not necessarily sequential, as different jurisdictions 
employ different methods. 
21 Voir dire is conducted either by the lawyers, the judge, or some combination of both, 
depending on the jurisdiction.  Some voir dire procedures are quick and judge-led, questioning 
the jurors in groups, while others rely on questionnaires and individualized follow-up. 
22 There is no limit to the number of challenges for cause.  See Stuart L. Young, 
Challenge for Cause in a Criminal Trial, 78 MICH. B.J. 976, 976 (1999). 
23 The number of peremptory challenges is set by statute and the allotment varies widely, 
from four challenges per side in all felony cases in Nevada, Ohio, Utah, and Virginia, to 
twenty challenges per side for serious felonies in California, New York, and South Dakota.  
See DAVID B. ROTTMAN & SHAUNA M. STRICKLAND, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 2004, at 228–32 tbl.41 (2006), available at 
http://goo.gl/wSNRHJ.  More challenges are typically granted in capital cases but still with 
wide variation, from four per side in Virginia up to twenty-five strikes per side in 
Connecticut.  See id. 
24 Not all jurisdictions require twelve jurors for criminal trials.  See Trial Juries: Size and 
Verdict Rules, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, at tbl.51a, http://goo.gl/GLWZVM (last 
updated Aug. 2, 2013).  While federal courts and the majority of states do use twelve-person 
juries, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, and Utah allow 
felony trials (though not capital cases) with six- or eight-juror panels.  See id. 
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A. THE ORIGINS OF THE CHALLENGE 
The peremptory challenge, the Supreme Court has observed, is “an 
arbitrary and capricious right, [which] must be exercised with full freedom, 
or it fails of its full purpose.”25  Unlike a challenge for cause, which only 
“permit[s] rejection of jurors on a narrowly specified, provable and legally 
cognizable basis of partiality,”26 a peremptory challenge may be “exercised 
without a reason stated, without inquiry, and without being subject to the 
court’s control.”27 
In the early fourteenth century, the English Parliament abolished the 
Crown’s right to challenge jurors simply by claiming the challenge was 
being exercised in the King’s name.28  Thereafter, “for more than five 
hundred years, use of the peremptory challenge was the exclusive right of 
the defense lawyer as a means of protecting the fair trial rights of an 
accused.”29  While defendants were entitled to have up to three dozen 
peremptory challenges,30 these rights appear to have been rarely exercised.31  
 
25 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (citation omitted). 
26 Id. at 220. 
27 Id. 
28 See Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a 
Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9 
(1990) (describing the operation of an act of Parliament passed in 1305). 
29 Id.  The Crown nonetheless retained the unlimited ability to have jurors “stand aside.”  
See Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71 (1887) (describing the “stand-aside” process).  This 
meant that, while it was restricted to challenges for cause, the Crown “was not obliged to 
show cause until the whole panel was called.”  Id.  Instead, the prosecution simply directed 
the jurors it did not want to “stand aside” and only had to show cause if a full jury could not 
be obtained from the rest of the panel.  See id.  Albert Alschuler suggests that the Medieval 
defendants’ challenges may have been a hybrid of cause and peremptory challenges; they 
ended up peremptory because it was quicker.  See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court 
and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 153, 165 n.51 (1989) [hereinafter Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury]. 
30 THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY, 1200–1800, at 134 (1985); see also J.B. Post, Jury Lists and 
Juries in the Late Fourteenth Century, in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE: THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 
JURY IN ENGLAND, 1200–1800, at 65, 71 (J.S. Cockburn & Thomas A. Green eds., 1988) (“The 
received opinion of the lawyers allowed a defendant to challenge jurors, peremptorily or for 
cause, and a maximum of thirty-five is the number usually cited.”). 
31 Thomas Andrew Green notes that criminal defendants were granted a high number of 
peremptory challenges—thirty-six challenges at common law, later reduced to twenty in the 
1540s—but that they were almost never exercised.  See GREEN, supra note 30, at 134.  This may 
have been because “[d]uring most of the history of the common law, peremptory challenges 
could at most have determined which members of a reasonably elite group of propertied men 
served on juries.”  Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury, supra note 29, at 165. 
2014] NEGOTIATING PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 11 
Over the next centuries, the number of challenges was gradually reduced 
until England abandoned the peremptory challenge entirely in 1988.32 
Conversely, the peremptory challenge flourished in the United States.33  
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, jury selection procedures 
expanded, lengthening the process “to a tedious and exasperating extent,” as 
one contemporary commentator griped.34  More importantly, the challenge 
took on a new significance in the face of an increasingly heterogeneous jury 
pool.  Before the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the racially motivated use of 
peremptory challenges did not arise because, in most states, African-
Americans were rarely called to jury service.35  But as Albert Alschuler 
observed, as eligibility for jury service broadened, “manifest[ing] 
democratic faith in the popular administration of justice, the peremptory 
challenge manifested countervailing doubt, mistrust, and ambivalence.”36 
B. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE CHALLENGE 
The justifications for the peremptory challenge have changed very 
little since Blackstone described what, in his view, were the two primary 
reasons for its use.  The first reason is that such a challenge could be an 
arbitrary prerogative: a litigant may simply have been seized with a sudden 
dislike for a juror, and “the law wills not that he should be tried by any one 
man against whom he has conceived a prejudice, even without being able to 
assign a reason for such his dislike.”37  Second, the peremptory challenge 
could protect a defendant from the resentment engendered in a prospective 
juror by a failed challenge for cause.38  The most convincing justifications 
 
32 See Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 118(1) (Eng.) (abolishing the right to 
challenge jurors without cause in criminal trials). 
33 Colonial courts in the United States had quickly adopted a defendant’s use of the 
peremptory challenge, and the prosecutor’s right to challenge peremptorily followed 
thereafter.  See Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 
65 TEMP. L. REV. 369, 374–75 (1992).  Prosecutors were deemed entitled to peremptory 
challenges on the basis that “the system should guarantee ‘not only freedom from any bias 
against the accused, but also from any prejudice against his prosecution.’”  Swain v. 
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (quoting Hayes, 120 U.S. at 70). 
34 JOHN PROFFATT, A TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY, INCLUDING QUESTIONS OF LAW AND 
FACT § 166, at 220 (1877). 
35 See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in 
the United States, 61 U. CHI L. REV. 867, 877 (1994).  The authors note that in 1791, 
“[e]very state limited jury service to men; every state except Vermont restricted jury service 
to property owners or taxpayers; three states permitted only whites to serve; and one state, 
Maryland, disqualified atheists.”  Id.  There do not appear to be any reported instances of 
African-Americans serving on juries until 1860.  See id. at 884. 
36 Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury, supra note 29, at 167. 
37 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *353. 
38 See id. 
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for the challenge rest on notions of party autonomy and participation—the 
theory that, by giving the litigants the chance to select their own juries, they 
are more likely to see the result reached by that jury as fair. 
1. Impartiality 
Impartiality—or at least its appearance—is the value most often 
invoked in support of the challenge.  “The function of the challenge,” wrote 
the Supreme Court in Swain v. Alabama, is primarily “to assure the parties 
that the jurors before whom they try  the case will decide on the basis of the 
evidence placed before them, and not otherwise.”39  The peremptory 
challenge has therefore been celebrated as “a suitable and necessary method 
of securing juries which in fact and in the opinion of the parties are fair and 
impartial.”40 
But this account is unconvincing.41  “In the exercise of peremptory 
challenges,” writes one commentator, “the lawyers, of course, seek not an 
impartial jury, but rather jurors most favorable to their client’s interests.”42  
Given the fact that removing biased jurors is the role of the challenge for 
cause, the most plausible argument is that peremptory challenges enable the 
parties to “eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides,”43 effectively 
canceling each other out.44  The prosecution can strike all of the most pro-
defense jurors, the defense can strike all of the most pro-prosecution jurors, 
and the remaining jurors are expected to cluster at the crest of the bell curve 
 
39 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965). 
40 Id. at 212 (paraphrasing Alabama’s argument).  This justification is echoed by 
numerous scholars.  See, e.g., Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful 
Power,” 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 552 (1975) (“The ideal that the peremptory serves is that the 
jury not only should be fair and impartial, but should seem to be so to those whose fortunes 
are at issue.”). 
41 Some scholars argue that, to the contrary, “[p]eremptory challenges ensure the 
selection of jurors on the basis of insulting stereotypes without substantially advancing the 
goal of making juries more impartial.”  Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury, supra 
note 29, at 170.  Some commentators claim that the appearance of impartiality, rather than 
impartiality itself, is the goal served.  See, e.g., Paul H. Schwartz, Comment, Equal 
Protection in Jury Selection? The Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky in North Carolina, 
69 N.C. L. REV. 1533, 1577 (1991) (“[T]he peremptory challenge [exists] not to facilitate the 
selection of juries that are actually impartial, but rather to foster the perception of 
impartiality and thus promote confidence in the criminal justice system.”). 
42 Melilli, supra note 13, at 453. 
43 Swain, 380 U.S. at 219. 
44 Some commentators describe this idea as the “canceling out” hypothesis, which 
“suggests that the use of peremptories is not an important problem because both sides 
discriminate and any harm caused by one side is immediately canceled or offset by the 
reciprocal strikes of the other side.”  Baldus et al., supra note 3, at 125. 
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of neutrality.  This idea is long-standing—as Barbara Babcock described 
the process in 1975: 
[N]either litigant is trying to choose “impartial” jurors, but rather to eliminate those 
who are sympathetic to the other side, hopefully leaving only those biased for him.  
But the interplay of the efforts of both sides to accomplish the same end should leave 
surviving jurors who are, as Lord Coke described them, “indifferent as they stand 
unsworn.”45 
In practice, this means that “[t]he police officer’s brother and the flower 
child will be among the first casualties in the striking process.”46 
Of course, whether the two sides’ strikes really cancel each other out 
depends on the number of favorable jurors in the pool to begin with; sheer 
mathematics will benefit the side whose favorable jurors are more 
numerous.  In a study of capital juries in Philadelphia, researchers found 
that the prime targets for prosecution strikes—typically, young, African-
American male jurors—appeared in jury pools in far fewer numbers than 
the prime targets for the defense—typically, older, white male jurors.  “As a 
result of this disparity in the sizes of their respective target groups, the 
[State] was more effective than defense counsel in depleting target group 
members from the pools of death eligible cases that each side considered.”47  
The mechanics of peremptory challenges therefore favor the side with the 
most to gain from majority participation, tilting the balance against the 
litigant whose most favorable jurors are few.48 
Finally, embedded in the idea that the challenge can eliminate 
“extremes of partiality,” leaving only the most “indifferent” jurors, is the 
assumption that an impartial jury is equivalent to the sum of its parts—that 
the twelve blandest jurors (often those who simply gave the fewest answers 
during voir dire) will form the most impartial jury.  Another arguably more 
persuasive view is that a truly impartial jury is one, not from which strong 
opinions have been purged, but whose impartiality is the fruit of the 
deliberative process.  Impartiality might more properly be seen as a 
perspective forged by the confrontation of diverse points of view rather than 
an immutable quality possessed by twelve separate people.49  On this view, 
the peremptory challenge does more to hinder impartiality than to champion 
it. 
 
45 Babcock, supra note 40, at 551. 
46 Fahringer, supra note 2, at 134. 
47 Baldus et al., supra note 3, at 125. 
48 This imbalance is exacerbated by the underrepresentation of minority jurors that 
begins at the jury assembly stage.  See infra note 209 and accompanying text. 
49 See ABRAMSON, supra note 2, at xxv (describing the diverse jury as impartial 
“precisely because every juror brings the perspectives of his or her kind into the jury room”). 
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2. Compensating for the Challenge for Cause 
Peremptory challenges are also valued for their ability to repair any 
injury caused by unsuccessful challenges for cause, particularly when the 
juror is aware that she has been challenged—and by whom—and then takes 
a rather jaundiced view of that party.50  Peremptory challenges defuse this 
fear and encourage a full and free voir dire (subject, of course, to the 
goodwill and patience of the judge, which typically flourish in inverse 
proportion to the length of the examination).51 
Peremptory challenges thus provide “a margin of protection for 
challenges for cause.”52  Not only are they quick and easy to use,53 but they 
also support the goal of impartiality by lessening the risk of error incurred 
by a challenge for cause improperly denied.54  But this idea of the 
peremptory challenge as “an essential fallback”55 is less a function of any 
innate quality of the peremptory challenge than a comment on the failings 
of the challenge for cause.  Worse, the very availability of the peremptory 
challenge seems to remove any incentive to improve the functioning of the 
challenge for cause.  As one state court judge noted, “Peremptory 
challenges have made all of us lazy—judges included—when it comes to 
challenges for cause.”56  Indeed, the existence of the peremptory challenge 
allows judges to sidestep the unpleasant task of ruling on whether a juror is 
 
50 As Blackstone described it, “Because, upon challenges for cause shown, if the reason 
assigned prove insufficient to set aside the juror, perhaps the bare questioning his 
indifference may sometimes provoke a resentment: to prevent all ill consequences from 
which, the prisoner is still at liberty, if he pleases, peremptorily to set him aside.”  4 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *353.  Some courts have applied this reasoning in the context 
of denied peremptory strikes as well.  See, e.g., Gaines v. State, 575 S.E.2d 704, 706 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2002) (reversing conviction where trial court denied defendant’s peremptory strikes 
under Batson and reseated jurors “despite the fact that they had been present when they were 
struck and were aware they were struck by the defendants”). 
51 The availability of peremptory challenges “allows counsel to ascertain the possibility 
of bias through probing questions on the voir dire and facilitates the exercise of challenges 
for cause by removing the fear of incurring a juror’s hostility through examination and 
challenge for cause.”  Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219–20 (1965). 
52 Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right 
Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 771 (1992). 
53 Barbara Underwood calls the peremptory a “device [that] has the advantage of saving 
the time of attorneys, jurors, and the court that would otherwise be spent in probing the true 
extent, if any, of the bias of potential jurors.”  Id. 
54 See id. (arguing that the peremptory “implements a sound judgment about the relative costs 
of errors: an error that seats a biased juror is fatal to the ideal of fair decisionmaking, while an 
error that excludes an unbiased juror ordinarily costs only the time of the people involved”). 
55 Id. 
56 Hoffman, supra note 11, at 139. 
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credible when she assures the court that she can be fair.57  It is easier simply 
to leave the juror on the panel and let the lawyers dismiss her peremptorily. 
It is true that when challenges for cause fall short, peremptory 
challenges can be profitably employed to fill any gaps.  But if challenges 
for cause are used too parsimoniously or inhibit the lawyers’ abilities to 
question the jurors, surely this could be ameliorated.  Perhaps courts could 
implement a new norm of expanded challenges for cause or procedures that 
excuse jurors neutrally (by the clerk of court, say).  Bar associations could 
improve lawyer training so that they can conduct effective voir dire without 
offending prospective jurors.58  Whatever steps are taken, it hardly seems 
unreasonable to consider ways in which to improve the challenge for cause, 
rather than leaving it in an unsatisfactory state and relying on the 
peremptory challenge to mop up after it. 
3. Autonomy and Participation 
In the end, the most persuasive argument in favor of the peremptory 
challenge is that it protects the parties’ autonomy by allowing them an 
active role in choosing their fact finder, beyond the court’s control.  It is 
this quality of free choice that enables a litigant to “have a good opinion of 
his jury, the want of which might totally disconcert him.”59  The 
capriciousness of the original challenge gave a defendant the unreviewable 
power to sculpt the jury as he saw fit, without having to explain or even 
“being able to assign a reason for such his dislike.”60  Even today, in a 
criminal justice system that can reduce defendants to near-powerlessness, 
the challenge’s arbitrariness can give participants a sense of control—they 
can get rid of jurors simply because they develop a spontaneous dislike for 
them based on no more than “sudden impressions and unaccountable 
prejudices.”61  For one brief moment during jury selection, even the 
 
57 Arguably, the judge sometimes may be trading one uncomfortable decision point—
does the prospective juror’s possible bias rise to the level of cause?—for another.  By 
leaving the juror on the panel for a litigant to strike peremptorily, the judge may instead need 
to determine whether the lawyer’s explanation for the strike is permissible under Batson. 
58 This Article is not the place to offer detailed proposals for improvements to the 
challenge-for-cause regime. 
59 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *353.  Indeed, as one judge noted, there has been little 
effort to improve on Blackstone’s formulation.  See Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory 
Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge’s Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 812–
13 (1997) (“Although there is no shortage of academic and judicial generalizations about the 
importance of the peremptory challenge, there have been remarkably few efforts to articulate 
precisely why the peremptory challenge is so important.”). 
60 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *353. 
61 Id.  These prejudices might be rooted in healthy self-preservation instincts.  As one 
commentator noted, we might “bear in mind the advice given by an experienced trial lawyer, 
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humblest litigant can wield the autocratic power of the Queen of Hearts, 
dismissing anyone who displeases her.62 
In addition, some scholars contend that participating in the creation of 
the tribunal is valuable in itself.  One of the principal functions of the 
peremptory challenge, writes Barbara Underwood, is “to provide the parties 
with an opportunity to participate in the construction of the decision-
making body, thereby enlisting their confidence in its decision.”63  This 
function is pedagogical: the challenge “teaches the litigant, and through him 
the community, that the jury is a good and proper mode for deciding 
matters and that its decision should be followed because in a real sense the 
jury belongs to the litigant: he chooses it.”64 
The autonomy and opportunity for participation provided by the 
challenge may also enhance the acceptability of verdicts to the parties and 
the public.  Certainly, being judged by a jury that one had some role in 
creating, as opposed to one that has simply been imposed on the litigant, 
may provide the litigant some solace.65  Regardless of conviction, the 
respect for one’s autonomy and freedom to choose may help legitimize the 
jury’s verdict in the eyes of the litigants. 
Most importantly, the challenge allows the parties a measure of 
independence from the judge.  “[T]he best—indeed, after Batson, the 
only—justification for peremptory challenges,” writes Charles Ogletree, “is 
that the trial judge should not necessarily have the sole power to determine 
who can sit on a jury . . . .”66  In a system without peremptory challenges, 
the only way to construct the jury would be through challenges for cause, 
which are decided by the court.  Therefore the judge alone could be 
responsible for determining who served on the jury.67  This is not a trivial 
 
who said, ‘If you don’t like a juror’s face, chances are he doesn’t like yours either—and 
you’d better get rid of him.’”  Fahringer, supra note 2, at 135 (quoting a possibly apocryphal 
“experienced trial lawyer”). 
62 See LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND 67 (North-South Books 1999) (1866).  In 
Carroll’s classic, an ill-fated croquet game played with flamingos for mallets and hedgehogs 
for balls tries the Queen of Hearts’ patience, and “in a very short time the Queen was in a 
furious passion, and went stamping about, and shouting ‘Off with his head!’ or ‘Off with her 
head!’ about once a minute.”  Id. 
63 Underwood, supra note 52, at 771. 
64 Babcock, supra note 40, at 552. 
65 Although the litigant’s solace may be substantially offset by his sense that his 
opponent has acted arbitrarily and unfairly in exercising his strikes. 
66 Ogletree, supra note 6, at 1140. 
67 See id.  Ogletree argues that abolishing the peremptory challenge would lead parties to 
rely exclusively on the challenge for cause, concentrating more power in the hands of the 
trial judge.  “The judge alone—in a series of highly discretionary, practically unreviewable 
decisions—would then be permitted to shape the jury in every case.”  Id. (quoting Barbara 
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concern.  For nearly fifty years, it has been an article of faith that the 
constitutional guarantees of trial by jury “reflect a fundamental decision 
about the exercise of official power—a reluctance to entrust plenary powers 
over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of 
judges.”68  The peremptory challenge therefore provides a systemic 
advantage, preserving a sphere of action in jury selection over which the 
court has limited control. 
C. THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE IN AMERICA 
The story of the peremptory challenge in America is inextricably 
linked with racial discrimination and the Supreme Court’s efforts to 
counteract it.  As discrimination evolved from explicit statutory bans on 
African-American participation in jury service69 to strategic but no less 
blatant uses of peremptory challenges,70 the Court was forced to come up 
with a way to reconcile the peremptory challenge’s arbitrary and capricious 
nature with the requirements of equal protection. 
1. Before Batson 
While the Supreme Court has frequently described the peremptory 
challenge as “necessary” for a fair trial, it has always stopped short of 
characterizing the peremptory challenge as a constitutional requirement.71  
“Challenge for cause is doubtless a constitutional right,” a Massachusetts 
federal circuit court noted in 1857, “as without its exercise the prisoner 
might be deprived of an impartial jury, but the peremptory challenge is a 
 
Allen Babcock, A Place in the Palladium, Women’s Rights and Jury Service, 61 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1139, 1175 (1993)). 
68 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968); see also Ogletree, supra note 6, at 
1140 (arguing that “the trial judge should not necessarily have the sole power to determine 
who can sit on a jury that itself exists because, in our legal system, some decisions should 
not be made by judges”). 
69 For example, in 1873 West Virginia enacted a statute that allowed only white men to 
serve on juries.  Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879).  In Strauder, the 
Supreme Court struck down the West Virginia statute as violating the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See id. at 310.  In addition, around 1791, “[t]hree 
states—South Carolina, Georgia, and Virginia—denied the vote to African-Americans,” 
which almost certainly operated as a ban on African-Americans serving on juries.  Alschuler 
& Deiss, supra note 35, at 877 n.52 (citation omitted). 
70 This shift happened very slowly.  See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 35, at 894–97 
(describing the halting progress of African-American participation on juries, particularly in 
the South). 
71 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. 
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 163 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the peremptory challenge 
as “a practice that has been considered an essential part of fair jury trial since the dawn of the 
common law”). 
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privilege conferred by law, which may be enlarged, abridged, or annulled 
by the legislative authority.”72 
The first real challenge to the peremptory’s free exercise came in 
Swain v. Alabama, over a century later.  Robert Swain, an African-
American sentenced to death for the rape of a white woman, had been 
convicted by a jury from which every African-American had been 
peremptorily struck.73  In a fairly uncomfortable opinion, the Swain Court 
struggled to reconcile the dictates of the Equal Protection Clause with the 
“arbitrary and capricious” nature of the challenge.  The Court had no 
trouble with the broad strokes, reaffirming the fact that “a State’s 
purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of 
participation as jurors in the administration of justice violates the Equal 
Protection Clause”74 and condemning such practices as antithetical to “‘our 
basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government.’”75 
Yet the Court could not bring itself to abandon the Blackstonian vision 
of the peremptory challenge.  Justice Byron White, writing for the Court, 
waxed eloquent on the challenge’s long and venerable history, its 
persistence in the face of criticism, and its extensive use.76  The Court 
declined to examine the reasons that might have motivated the prosecutor to 
strike all six African-American jurors from the panel,77 averring that the 
challenge “‘must be exercised with full freedom, or it fails of its full 
purpose.’”78 
Faced with the tension between the Constitution and the peremptory 
challenge,79 the Court chose the challenge, concluding that “[t]o subject the 
 
72 United States v. Plumer, 27 F. Cas. 561, 575–76 (C.C.D. Mass. 1859) (No. 16,056); 
see also Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2009) (“This Court has long recognized 
that peremptory challenges are not of federal constitutional dimension.” (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted)). 
73 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 203, 205.  There had been eight black jurors on the petit jury 
venire; two were found to be exempt, and six were struck by the prosecution.  See id. at 205.  
In fact, the Court found that no African-American had served on a jury in Talladega County, 
Alabama, since about 1950.  See id. 
74 Id. at 203–04 (citations omitted).  This principle had been established almost one 
hundred years earlier in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308–09 (1879), which held 
that a state law prohibiting African-Americans from sitting on juries violated the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
75 Swain, 380 U.S. at 204 (quoting Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940)). 
76 See id. at 219 (claiming that these factors “demonstrate the long and widely held belief 
that peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury”). 
77 Instead, the Court adopted a presumption “that the prosecutor is using the State’s 
challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury to try the case before the court.”  Id. at 222. 
78 Id. at 219 (quoting Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892)). 
79 In dissent, Justice Arthur Goldberg explicitly acknowledged the starkness of the 
choice.  See id. at 244 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (“Were it necessary to make an absolute 
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prosecutor’s challenge in any particular case to the demands and traditional 
standards of the Equal Protection Clause would entail a radical change in 
the nature and operation of the challenge.”80  And that the Court refused to 
countenance.81 
2. Batson v. Kentucky and Thereafter 
Unrestricted by the commands of equal protection, the peremptory 
challenge after Swain endured as “the last bastion of undisguised racial 
discrimination in the criminal justice system.”82  Batson v. Kentucky was 
therefore an important step in deterring the blatant and unapologetic use of 
race in jury selection.  James Kirkland Batson, an African-American, was 
charged with second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods.83  At trial, 
the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to remove all four black 
prospective jurors, and Batson was consequently convicted by an all-white 
jury.84  For the first time, the Court held that “the Equal Protection Clause 
forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of 
their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable 
impartially to consider the State’s case against a black defendant.”85 
To guide the lower courts, Batson established a three-step framework 
for determining whether a peremptory strike had been exercised in violation 
of equal protection.  First, the defendant had to establish a prima facie case 
of purposeful discrimination.86  Once the defendant made this showing, the 
burden shifted to the prosecution to “come forward with a neutral 
 
choice between the right of a defendant to have a jury chosen in conformity with the 
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the right to challenge peremptorily, the 
Constitution compels a choice of the former.”). 
80 Id. at 221–22 (majority opinion). 
81 While the Court did not entirely close the door on Equal Protection Clause claims 
made in the peremptory challenge context, it did set forth a test that could not be met.  If a 
defendant could show that a prosecutor’s office in a particular county employed its 
peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors “in case after case, whatever the 
circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be,” with 
the result that no blacks ever served on juries in the county, then the Fourteenth Amendment 
claim would take on “added significance.”  Id. at 223.  Consequently, for the next twenty 
years, practically no defendants were able to make a successful claim that prosecutors were 
using their peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory fashion.  See United States v. 
Childress, 715 F.2d 1313, 1316 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (noting that defendants had been 
able to establish “systematic exclusion in only two cases since Swain was decided in 1965”). 
82 Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury, supra note 29, at 167. 
83 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82 (1986). 
84 See id. at 83. 
85 Id. at 89. 
86 See id. at 96. 
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explanation for challenging black jurors.”87  The Court emphasized that this 
explanation “need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for 
cause,” but warned that the prosecutor could not rebut a prima facie case by 
stating that he had acted on the assumption that the struck jurors “would be 
partial to the defendant because of their shared race.”88  At the third step, 
the Court directed trial courts to determine whether the defendant had 
established purposeful discrimination.89 
Despite Batson’s own insistence on racial commonality between the 
defendant and the prospective jurors,90 the Court soon changed its focus 
from the exclusion of nonwhite jurors from  nonwhite defendants’ cases to 
protecting the rights of the excluded jurors, regardless of the race of the 
defendant.  In Powers v. Ohio, a case in which a white defendant objected 
to the exclusion of black jurors, the Court held that “the Equal Protection 
Clause prohibits a prosecutor from using the State’s peremptory challenges 
to exclude otherwise qualified and unbiased persons from the petit jury 
solely by reason of their race, a practice that forecloses a significant 
opportunity to participate in civic life.”91 
Accordingly, the right to make a Batson claim was extended to 
defendants who did not share the race of the excluded jurors,92 to civil 
litigants,93 and to the prosecution.94  Protected categories expanded to 
include gender and ethnicity.95  The end result was a jurisprudence that 
changed the nature of the peremptory challenge, prompting Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor to muse that “as we add, layer by layer, additional 
 
87 Id. at 97.  The Court further directed the prosecutor to provide “a neutral explanation related 
to the particular case to be tried.”  Id. at 98.  The Court later explained that the neutral explanation 
need not be “persuasive, or even plausible.”  Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995). 
88 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 (citations omitted).  The Court explicitly forbade the state from 
making the assumption either that “blacks as a group are unqualified to serve as jurors . . . 
[or] that they will be biased in a particular case simply because the defendant is black.”  Id. 
89 See id. at 98.  The Court nonetheless declined to “formulate particular procedures to be 
followed upon a defendant’s timely objection to a prosecutor’s challenges.”  Id. at 99. 
90 The original Batson test required the defendant to show that he was a member of a 
cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor had used peremptory challenges to strike 
members of that group.  See id. at 96. 
91 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402–03, 409 (1991). 
92 See id. at 415–16 (explaining that defendant may raise a Batson claim even where 
defendant and jurors are of different races). 
93 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 627–31 (1991) (extending 
Batson to civil cases). 
94 See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (forbidding race-based strikes by 
defense counsel). 
95 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130–31 (1994) (extending 
constitutional protection to strikes based on gender); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 
355 (1991) (affirming constitutional protection against strikes based on ethnicity). 
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constitutional restraints on the use of the peremptory, we force lawyers to 
articulate what we know is often inarticulable.  In so doing, we make the 
peremptory challenge less discretionary and more like a challenge for 
cause.”96 
Demanding litigants to give a reason for their exercise of an “arbitrary 
and capricious right” makes little sense, as Chief Justice Warren Burger, 
dissenting in Batson, pointed out.  “It is called a peremptory challenge, 
because the prisoner may challenge peremptorily, on his own dislike, 
without showing of any cause,”97 wrote the Chief Justice, exasperation 
seeping through every line.  “Analytically, there is no middle ground: A 
challenge either has to be explained or it does not.”98 
What we are left with today is a “quasi-peremptory challenge” that sort 
of has to be explained.99  The requirement of an explanation undermines the 
values of autonomy and free choice that the challenge represented.  Yet the 
explanation does not have to be “persuasive, or even plausible,”100 so long 
as the trial court finds it credible.101  Meanwhile, the Court has given the 
trial courts very little guidance as to how, exactly, they are to determine an 
attorney’s credibility.  And “without clearer standards, Batson asks trial 
judges to read attorneys’ minds,”102 something they are singularly ill-
equipped to do. 
D. RESPONSES 
What we have now is the worst of both worlds: persistent concerns 
about racial discrimination paired with a peremptory challenge that does not 
function properly.  The chorus of criticism has not been lacking—Batson’s 
standards have been dubbed “a shameful sham,”103 “a disingenuous 
charade,”104 and a possible “invitation to hypocrisy.”105  Finding ways either 
 
96 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 148 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
97 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 127 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 
HENRY H. JOY, ON PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE OF JURORS 1 (1844) (emphasis added by Justice 
Burger)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
98 Id. 
99 See Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury, supra note 29, at 200. 
100 Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768–70 (1995) (upholding as “race neutral” 
prosecutor’s explanation that he struck two black jurors because of their hair and beards). 
101 See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003) (noting that “the issue comes down 
to whether the trial court finds the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations to be credible”). 
102 Ogletree, supra note 6, at 1109. 
103 Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: 
The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed 
Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 165 (2010). 
104 Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory 
Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21, 67 (1993) [hereinafter Johnson, Language and Culture]. 
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to improve the Batson framework or to eliminate peremptory challenges has 
spawned its own cottage industry of academic and judicial proposals to 
“fix” jury selection.  All these proposals share a common goal: to lessen the 
race-based use of peremptory challenges.  But short of mandating 
affirmative selection or a quota system, the only truly effective way of 
ending the race-based use of peremptory challenges would be to eliminate 
the peremptory challenge entirely—a solution unlikely to happen and that 
raises problems of its own. 
1. Tweaks, Quotas, and Affirmative Selection 
Proposals to improve the current regime fall into two camps: either a 
complete overhaul of jury selection procedures or a strengthening of the 
Batson framework.  The most ambitious proposals have advocated for 
affirmative selection, which would allow litigants to designate certain jurors 
to remain on the panel,106 or racial quotas to ensure some demographic 
diversity on jury panels, particularly at trials of nonwhite defendants.107  
 
105 Raymond Brown, Peremptory Challenges as a Shield for the Pariah, 31 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1203, 1204 (1994). 
106 This proposal was most clearly set forth in a student note.  See Tracey L. Altman, 
Note, Affirmative Selection: A New Response to Peremptory Challenge Abuse, 38 STAN. L. 
REV. 781, 806–11 (1986) (describing affirmative selection model).  Altman proposed that 
both sides submit a list of twelve jurors ranked in order of preference with the judge then 
empaneling “any overlapping choices, regardless of their differing ranks.  Then, alternating 
between the lists, the judge would take each party’s selection in descending order, until the 
appropriate number of jurors were empanelled.”  Id. at 806; see also Deborah Ramirez, 
Affirmative Jury Selection: A Proposal to Advance Both the Deliberative Ideal and Jury 
Diversity, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 161, 171 (suggesting litigants be provided with a fixed 
number of affirmative peremptory choices, giving them “a limited opportunity to create a 
jury of his or her peers”); Clem Turner, Note, What’s the Story? An Analysis of Juror 
Discrimination and a Plea for Affirmative Jury Selection, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 289, 319 
(1996) (suggesting a structure similar to Ramirez’s except that the judge would choose two 
jurors from the prosecution’s list for every one juror from the defense’s list to account for the 
burden of proof).  All of these proposals start from the assumption, with which I agree, that 
“the racial, religious, and ethnic diversity of the jury has a positive and important influence 
on the jury process.”  Ramirez, supra, at 162. 
107 See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW § 5.22, at 412–13 (3d 
ed. 1992) (presenting a scenario with hypothetical legislation mandating that a jury for a 
nonwhite defendant be composed of at least 50% nonwhite jurors); Sheri Lynn Johnson, 
Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1698–99 (1985) (proposing 
that every defendant of color should have at least three “racially similar” jurors on his petit 
jury); Harold A. McDougall, Note, The Case for Black Juries, 79 YALE L.J. 531, 546–50 
(1970) (proposing proportional representation schemes for criminal juries); see also Albert 
W. Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44 DUKE L.J. 704, 718 (1995) [hereinafter 
Alschuler, Racial Quotas] (noting that “affirmative action in jury selection has special 
virtues and . . . is likely to prove less costly to individuals and society than affirmative action 
in other contexts”). 
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There have been proposals to give litigants cumulative voting rights 
borrowed from the corporate sphere108 and to develop a “peremptory block” 
system, where each side would submit to the judge a confidential list of 
venire members they designated as “blocked”; if the other side then 
attempted to strike that juror, the juror would be automatically seated on the 
jury.109  Others have called for voir dire to be conducted entirely by jury 
questionnaire, so that selection would be “blind” rather than influenced by 
group status,110 or for proposed ethical rules that would prevent attorneys 
from exercising their challenges on the basis of race.111 
Commentators have also suggested modifications to Batson’s 
framework112 in an attempt to strengthen the notoriously weak second prong 
of the test.113  Some propose that trial courts should avoid making any 
determination of the striking attorney’s subjective intent,114 or advocate for 
 
108 See Edward S. Adams & Christian J. Lane, Constructing a Jury that Is Both Impartial 
and Representative: Utilizing Cumulative Voting in Jury Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703, 
745–46 (1998) (proposing a set number of votes for each side to be exercised either positively, 
to seat a juror, or negatively, to strike a juror); Geoffrey Cockrell, Note, Batson Reform: A 
Lottery System of Affirmative Selection, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 351, 381 
(1997) (proposing a modified lottery system incorporating cumulative voting). 
109 See Brian W. Stoltz, Note, Rethinking the Peremptory Challenge: Letting Lawyers 
Enforce the Principles of Batson, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1047 (2007).  As the author 
explains, this provision “would cause a prosecutor to hesitate in exercising peremptory 
strikes against an obvious class of potential jurors who might be stereotypically ‘favorable’ 
to the defendant . . . .”  Id. at 1050. 
110 See Jean Montoya, The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge: Voir Dire by 
Questionnaire and the “Blind” Peremptory, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 981, 1015–16 (1996). 
111 See Andrew G. Gordon, Note, Beyond Batson v. Kentucky: A Proposed Ethical Rule 
Prohibiting Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 685, 713 (1993) 
(advocating a rule of professional conduct to forbid discrimination “on the basis of race, sex, 
religion, or national origin”).  Ogletree took this idea one step further and suggested 
sanctions for prosecutors who violated Batson that included dismissal of the case with 
prejudice.  See Ogletree, supra note 6, at 1116–17. 
112 See, e.g., Brian J. Serr & Mark Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the 
Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1, 64–65 (1988) (proposing three-part test at the second step of the Batson inquiry, requiring 
that the prosecutor’s explanation be specific, rationally related to juror bias, and bona fide); 
Joshua E. Swift, Note, Batson’s Invidious Legacy: Discriminatory Juror Exclusion and the 
“Intuitive” Peremptory Challenge, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 336, 361–62 (1993) (advancing idea 
that courts should not accept prosecutorial explanations for strikes based on “soft data,” such 
as demeanor and intuition, but only those based on the juror’s written or oral statements). 
113 As some commentators have quipped, jurors are more likely to be struck by lightning 
than by a lawyer violating the Equal Protection Clause.  See Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. 
Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More than the Unapologetically Bigoted or 
Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1102 (2011). 
114 See id. at 1123. 
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an expansion of attorney-conducted voir dire,115 or urge courts to reject 
explanations that betray a mixed motive.116  But these proposals do not 
address the fact that some lawyers are reluctant to raise Batson challenges 
in the first place, often for fear of being “Batsoned” in return.  And many 
other litigants never get to step two of the Batson test.117 
However ingenious some of these suggestions, there is no indication 
that any have ever been adopted.  Some may have been too complicated to 
implement.118  Some merely shifted the standard slightly.  And most did not 
give sufficient assurance that they would effectively remediate racial 
discrimination in jury selection or help resolve the tensions between the 
Batson framework and the value of the peremptory challenge. 
2. Abolition of Peremptory Strikes 
The only truly effective curb on racially motivated peremptory 
challenges is to eliminate them entirely.  Since they are not constitutionally 
mandated, there is no obligation to keep them.  Indeed, England, the 
birthplace of the peremptory challenge, abolished the challenge some 
twenty-five years ago.119  In the United States, ever since Justice Thurgood 
Marshall warned in his Batson concurrence that “[t]he decision today will 
not end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-
selection process,” and suggested that only elimination of the challenges 
could do so,120 there has been a steady chorus of calls for abolition from 
scholars, judges, and Supreme Court Justices.121  Yet no U.S. jurisdiction 
has to date eliminated the peremptory challenge.122 
 
115 See, e.g., Ogletree, supra note 6, at 1127–28 (listing reasons why expansive voir dire 
conducted by attorneys is an important tool for making Batson effective). 
116 See Russell D. Covey, The Unbearable Lightness of Batson: Mixed Motives and 
Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66 MD. L. REV. 279, 316 (2007). 
117 See infra notes 133–34 and accompanying text. 
118 The cumulative voting suggestions, though clever, required the apportionment of 
twenty-four lottery tickets to each litigant, one ticket for each prospective juror, and a 
random selection by the judge.  See Cockrell, supra note 108, at 381. 
119 See Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 118(1) (Eng.) (abolishing peremptory 
challenges in criminal trials).  The boldness of this move is somewhat blunted by the fact 
that jury unanimity is not required.  See Juries Act, 1974, c. 23, § 17(1)(a) & (b) (Eng.) 
(providing for majority verdicts in felony trials). 
120 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102–03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
121 See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 273 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“I 
believe it necessary to reconsider Batson’s test and the peremptory challenge system as a 
whole.”); Bennett, supra note 103, at 167 (“I join Justice [Thurgood] Marshall and Justice 
[Stephen] Breyer’s call for banning peremptory challenges entirely as the only means to 
eliminate lawyers’ tendency to strike jurors due to stereotype and bias.”); Broderick, supra 
note 33, at 418, 420 (arguing that the peremptory challenge “functions as a repository of the 
unexamined fears, suspicions, and hatreds held by attorneys and their clients” and thus 
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The foremost reason that peremptory challenges have survived seems 
to be a lack of political will: Trial lawyers value peremptory challenges and 
are unlikely ever to agree to their abolition.123  Some litigators see them as 
an essential protection for their clients’ rights.  “To take away that tool, 
especially from that most benighted soul—the unpopular criminal 
defendant who is black, who is Latino, who is a pariah,” wrote one criminal 
defense attorney, “is, in and of itself, a criminal and amoral act.”124  Other 
lawyers simply “love peremptory challenges because they are fun.”125  
Either way, lawyers are not likely to part with their challenges anytime 
soon.126 
Even so, abolition is not an optimal solution.  Without the peremptory 
challenge, the judge alone would have final say over who serves on the 
jury.127  “If we were to abolish peremptory challenges altogether, parties 
would be totally dependent on the goodwill and sensibilities of the 
particular trial judge,” cautioned one commentator.  “Systemically, that 
would put an enormous amount of largely unchecked power in the hands of 
one individual.”128  Beyond serving an error-correcting function for the 
challenge for cause, the peremptory challenge can provide genuine 
 
should be abolished); Hoffman, supra note 59, at 853 (arguing that “peremptory challenges 
conflict with the most basic notions of individual liberty and individual responsibility 
inherent in the idea of trial by an impartial jury”); Nancy S. Marder, Batson Revisited, 97 
IOWA L. REV. 1585, 1607 (2012) (“The elimination of the peremptory would improve the 
jury process in . . . significant ways.”); Antony Page, Batson’s Blind Spot: Unconscious 
Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 246 (2005) (noting the 
“powerful reason[s] to eliminate the peremptory challenge”); John Paul Stevens, Foreword, 
78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 907, 907–08 (2003) (“A citizen should not be denied the opportunity 
to serve as a juror unless an impartial judge can state an acceptable reason for the denial.  A 
challenge for cause provides such a reason; a peremptory challenge does not.”). 
122 See ROTTMAN & STRICKLAND, supra note 23, at 228–32 tbl.41. 
123 Every lawyer, it seems, believes he can make the challenge work for him, despite 
substantial evidence “that lawyers, and even their highly paid jury consultants, are no better at 
detecting hidden juror bias than a monkey throwing a dart.”  Hoffman, supra note 11, at 139. 
124 Brown, supra note 105, at 1212; see also Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 60 
(1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I am certain that black criminal defendants will rue the 
day that this Court ventured down this road that inexorably will lead to the elimination of 
peremptory strikes.”). 
125 Hoffman, supra note 11, at 140.  Peremptory challenges allow lawyers to engage in 
the kind of pop-psychology insights that usually characterize couch discussions of a favorite 
television show.  As Hoffman puts it, “It’s drivel, but it’s fun drivel.”  Id. 
126 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
127 See Ogletree, supra note 6, at 1140; see also Babcock, supra note 67, at 1175.  And 
“if the judge is racially biased too,” litigants would have little recourse.  See Johnson, 
Language and Culture, supra note 104, at 67. 
128 Ramirez, supra note 106, at 172 n.37. 
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protection against the “compliant, biased, or eccentric judge”129 making a 
final ruling on the challenge for cause. 
Judges are no more immune to implicit biases than anyone else.130  
Even under an expanded regime of challenges for cause, the judge may still 
sympathize more readily with one side’s argument than the other.131  The 
peremptory challenge, which allows the litigants rather than the judge to 
shape the jury, may be necessary to the jury’s democratic function.  This 
Article’s proposal, therefore, seeks to preserve the best of the challenge—its 
ability to give the parties autonomy to make their own decisions and 
independence from the judge—while erecting an effective block against its 
most invidious uses. 
II. THE TROUBLE WITH BATSON 
Despite its logical incoherence and the enforcement difficulties it 
presents, Batson’s framework would be worth the price if it significantly 
helped remedy illegal discrimination in jury selection.  But Batson has not 
fulfilled its promise of remedying the exclusion of minority jurors from jury 
service.  Instead, it has created cumbersome procedures and appeals of 
Dickensian length, all because the Batson Court failed to recognize two 
fundamental truths.  First, cognitive biases will doom any framework based 
on self-reporting.  Second, the Batson framework is in tension with 
lawyers’ obligations of zealous advocacy.  The end result is that Batson has 
failed in its mission of protecting the right of democratic participation by 
all. 
A. UNWIELDINESS 
Without making an appreciable difference to lawyers’ strategies 
(although no doubt successfully driving them underground), Batson has 
proved to be an “enforcement nightmare” at all levels of the court system.132  
 
129 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). 
130 And these biases appear to be more pronounced when the judges are white.  See 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1195, 1210 (2009).  Rachlinski and his coauthors administered a 
psychological test measuring implicit racial bias to eighty-five white judges and forty-three 
black judges.  They found that 87% of the white judges demonstrated a white preference on 
the test while only 44% of the black judges did.  See id. 
131 Since many state court judges are elected, they are particularly vulnerable to political 
pressure.  A little over half of the states elect their felony court judges, seventeen states 
appoint their judges, and seven states use both methods.  See Trial Juries: Size and Verdict 
Rules, supra note 24, at tbl.36a. 
132 See William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease but Killing the Patient, 
1987 SUP. CT. REV. 97, 134; see also Frederic M. Bloom, Information Lost and Found, 100 
CALIF. L. REV. 635, 653 (2012) (citing Pizzi, supra, at 134). 
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The problems with Batson are built into its unwieldy structure.  First, the 
protection relies on the aggrieved party to raise it, and lawyers often fail to 
raise Batson objections.133  This seems to be less a result of attorney 
incompetence than simple strategy: on the evidence, “the two sides tolerate 
one another’s discriminatory use of peremptories to reduce the risk that a 
successful retaliatory claim will be brought by the other side.”134  Given the 
number of collateral attacks for which defendants claim they received 
ineffective assistance of counsel because their attorneys failed to raise 
Batson issues, at least some legitimate claims are not raised in the first 
place.135  Finally, now that prosecutors can make “reverse Batson” claims 
 
133 This was a conclusion of David Baldus’s study of capital juries in Philadelphia.  He 
writes that “while evidence of systemic discrimination across cases is strong at the individual 
case level, i.e., statistically significant race and gender disparities in about one-half of the 
cases, defense counsel and prosecutors infrequently raise Batson and McCollum claims.”  
Baldus et al., supra note 3, at 83; accord Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Racial Discrimination in 
Jury Selection: Professional Misconduct, Not Legitimate Advocacy, 22 REV. LITIG. 209, 
214–15 & n.21 (2003). 
134 Baldus et al., supra note 3, at 83–84. 
135 See, e.g., Brazil v. United States, No. 07–20531, 2013 WL 5476249, at *2–5 (E.D. 
Mich. Oct. 1, 2013) (considering ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on failure to 
raise Batson challenge after prosecutor struck the only two African-Americans on the jury 
panel); Price v. Sec’y, No. 6:09–cv–1061–Orl–35GJK, 2011 WL 2561246, at *5–9 (M.D. 
Fla. June 28, 2011) (considering ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on failure to 
object to prosecution’s strike of only African-American on the venire); Grate v. Stinson, 224 
F. Supp. 2d 496, 511–20 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding defendant’s appellate counsel ineffective 
for failing to raise Batson claim against government’s impermissible exercise of peremptory 
challenges based on race during jury selection); see also Scott v. Hubert, 635 F.3d 655, 663 
& n.8 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that defendant had presented “factually detailed and legally 
specific arguments in support of his claim that his lawyers rendered constitutionally 
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the racial makeup of the jury” in view 
of the fact that the prosecution had struck all four of the African-American jurors on the 
panel); Jackson v. State, No. CR–07–1208, 2010 WL 5130867, at *3 (Ala. Crim. App. Dec. 
17, 2010) (remanding capital murder conviction to determine whether State had race-neutral 
reasons for its challenges to African-American venire members where defendant did not 
raise Batson objection at trial); Lackey v. State, 104 So. 3d 234, 238–39 (Ala. Crim. App. 
2010) (remanding capital murder conviction to determine whether State had race-neutral 
reasons for striking African-American venire members where defendant did not raise Batson 
objection at trial). 
To know exactly what is going on at the trial level is difficult, if not impossible.  Most 
states and counties do not keep aggregated demographic records of who is called to jury 
duty, nor do they keep lists of the individuals struck or selected.  The best anyone has been 
able to do with the data available is to examine appellate cases that review trial-level Batson 
decisions.  These cases, obviously, only capture those instances in which a defendant is 
convicted and raises the issue on appeal.  In the absence of an appeal, there is no hard data 
on the Batson challenges that might have been made but were not (except as part of a 
collateral attack where they can be revived through the medium of an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim), cases where the defendant was acquitted at trial, or cases where the 
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against defendants under Georgia v. McCollum,136 Batson has proved to be 
a far more effective sword against defendants than a shield to protect them, 
as “reverse Batson” claims appear to enjoy a far higher success rate at trial 
than defendants’ Batson claims against prosecutors.137 
Another great disadvantage is that Batson’s standards are 
inconsistently applied and interpreted, generating a large quantity of 
ultimately unedifying litigation.138  If the actual Batson process during jury 
selection is often fairly quick and informal—one lawyer objects, the judge 
directs the other lawyer to respond—the appellate process can drag on for 
years.139  Batson claims at trial are frequently denied, as “[t]he current 
framework makes it exceedingly difficult for judges to reject even the most 
spurious of peremptory strikes.”140  But there are many technical reversals, 
as trial courts misinterpret how Batson should be applied or fail to maintain 
 
defendant successfully raised a Batson claim at trial and was either acquitted or was 
convicted and had no need to raise the Batson issue on appeal. 
136 See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992). 
137 See Melilli, supra note 13, at 463 (noting a success rate for Batson claims of 16.95% when 
the challenged juror was black and 13.33% when the challenged juror was Hispanic).  In contrast, 
when the Batson challenge was made following the exclusion of a white juror, the success rate of 
the Batson claim was 53.33%.  Id.  It is not entirely clear from Melilli’s article whether he meant 
success rate in the trial court or on appeal, although it appears to be a combination. 
138 See Minetos v. City Univ. of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 177, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (pointing 
out that “judicial interpretations of Batson are all over the map”); Nancy S. Marder, Justice 
Stevens, the Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1683, 1707–08 
(2006) (describing inconsistencies in Batson application).  While the Batson Court was 
unpersuaded “that our holding will create serious administrative difficulties,” Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986), this pronouncement, as one commentator noted wryly, 
“seemed to reveal a limited understanding of the litigation process.”  Alschuler, The 
Supreme Court and the Jury, supra note 29, at 199. 
139 Miller-El v. Dretke alone generated “17 years of largely unsuccessful and protracted 
litigation—including 8 different judicial proceedings and 8 different judicial opinions, and 
involving 23 judges, of whom 6 found the Batson standard violated and 16 the contrary.”  
545 U.S. 231, 267 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
140 Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 113, at 1077.  For a selection of upheld explanations for 
strikes, see, for example, McElemore v. State, 798 So. 2d 693, 697 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) 
(finding no clear error where prosecutor explained a strike on the ground that a juror had “the 
type of personality that it seems that . . . she would probably be greatly offended by the fact that 
the prosecutor did overlook her and did leave her out of asking [any additional] questions” 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)); State v. Crawford, 873 So. 2d 768, 780, 783–84 (La. 
Ct. App. 2004) (affirming trial court’s finding of race-neutrality in a strike where prosecutor 
stated, “He looks like a drug dealer to me”); Shelley v. State, 30 So. 3d 379, 382–84 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2010) (upholding prosecutorial strike of black juror because, as prosecutor stated, he wore 
“his hair in long braids”); Watson v. State, 991 So. 2d 662, 664, 666 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) 
(upholding strikes of five black jurors where prosecutor stated, for example, “my information is 
that she is on drugs” and “my information is that he runs with the dopers”). 
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an adequate record.141  As a result, cases are remanded and re-appealed, 
with defendants in limbo and victims denied closure.  All of the post-trial 
challenges, counterchallenges, and reopening of old records take up an 
enormous amount of time and resources.  A Batson violation at trial can 
lead to automatic reversal on appeal, but the success rate is quite low.142  
Instead, a far more likely outcome is a strange beast variously called a 
Batson hearing or a “reconstruction hearing,”143 which requires parties to 
testify years later to what they were thinking in the split seconds during 
which they made strikes, based on little more than dim memories and 
scrawled handwritten notes.  And then the claim is usually denied.144 
In the face of all this, it would be hard to improve on one 
commentator’s  observation that “[i]f one wanted to understand how the 
 
141 See, e.g., People v. Ibarra, No. E031542, 2003 WL 21739035, at *5–9 (Cal. Ct. App. 
July 28, 2003) (finding that trial court erred in requiring “systematic exclusion” to find a 
prima facie case); State v. Davis, 155 P.3d 1207, 1216 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that 
“the trial court’s failure to properly analyze Davis’ challenge to the prosecutor’s use of 
peremptory strikes to exclude [two minority jurors] from the jury under the third Batson step 
requires that the case be remanded for a proper Batson hearing”). 
142 I reviewed the reported Batson appeals in seven states: Alabama, California, Georgia, 
Illinois, Kansas, Mississippi, and New York, from 2000 to 2011.  In Georgia, out of 121 
cases appealing the denial of a defendant’s Batson claim at trial, only three resulted in a 
reversal of the defendant’s conviction and a new trial.  An additional two cases were 
remanded for Batson hearings, but the outcome of those hearings is not reported.  See 
Georgia Batson Spreadsheet (on file with the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology).  
In the sixteen cases in which the defendant appealed a prosecutor’s successful reverse-
Batson motion, the judgments were affirmed in twelve cases, and a new trial was granted in 
four cases.  See id.  In terms of preventing the prosecution from exercising peremptory 
challenges allegedly based on race, these figures indicate that a defendant’s chances of 
obtaining a new trial on appeal are under 3%.  But defendants had better luck reversing their 
convictions when their own peremptory challenges were blocked by a Batson ruling; they 
obtained new trials approximately one quarter of the time, though the number of appeals on 
this issue may be too low to reach statistical significance.  See id.  In Mississippi, out of 
ninety-one cases decided between 2000 and 2012—seventy-eight appealing the denial of a 
defendant’s Batson claim at trial and thirteen appealing a prosecutor’s successful reverse-
Batson motion—only three resulted in a reversal of the defendant’s conviction and a new 
trial.  See Mississippi Batson Spreadsheet (on file with the Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology).  An additional four cases were remanded for Batson hearings, all of which 
were unsuccessful.  See id.  In Kansas, out of forty-four appeals raising Batson claims, forty-
two were affirmed, and two were remanded for Batson hearings.  See Kansas Batson 
Spreadsheet (on file with the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology). 
143 See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 136 P.3d 804, 807–08 (Cal. 2006) (remanding case to the trial 
court to require prosecutor to explain his peremptory challenges); Davis, 155 P.3d at 1216 (same). 
144 See, e.g., Grimsley v. State, 678 So. 2d 1197, 1200–01 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) 
(affirming lower court’s decision, following a Batson hearing, that defendant had not 
proved discrimination); People v. Rodriguez, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 308, 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1999) (same); People v. Davis, 909 N.E.2d 766, 775–76 (Ill. 2009) (same); State v. 
Bolton, 49 P.3d 468, 481 (Kan. 2002) (same); People v. Wint, 655 N.Y.S.2d 469, 470–73 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (same). 
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American trial system for criminal cases came to be the most expensive and 
time-consuming in the world, it would be difficult to find a better starting 
point than Batson.”145 
B. THE PROBLEM OF IMPLICIT BIAS 
The critical weakness of Batson is conceptual.  The entire framework 
rests on the assumption that considerations of race are conscious and can be 
purged from the jury selection process either by honest self-reporting or by 
judicial assessments of attorney motivation.  Like most unstated 
assumptions about human behavior embedded in legal doctrine,146  Batson’s 
foundations are psychologically naïve.  Recent advances in social cognition 
research have shown that most of us operate under a considerable burden of 
implicit bias.147  While racism is no longer socially, morally, or legally 
acceptable, even people who believe themselves committed to 
egalitarianism may simultaneously hold negative views about racial 
minorities in general and African-Americans in particular.148  Cognitive 
research suggests that people automatically categorize others upon first 
contact and that they use the most salient characteristics, such as race and 
gender, to do so.149  As one research team put it, “The ability to understand 
 
145 Pizzi, supra note 132, at 155. 
146 As Linda Hamilton Krieger and Susan Fiske have observed, “[T]he behavioral theories 
embedded in legal doctrines often go unstated.  Even when stated, they are often unexamined, 
and they are almost never empirically tested . . . .”  Krieger & Fiske, supra note 5, at 998. 
147 As the song from the satirical musical Avenue Q puts it, “Everyone’s a little bit 
racist.”  See ROBERT LOPEZ & JEFF MARX, Everyone’s a Little Bit Racist, on AVENUE Q: THE 
MUSICAL (RCA Victory Broadway 2003) (“Everyone’s a little bit racist sometimes / Doesn’t 
mean we go around committing hate crimes / Look around and you will find / No one’s 
really colorblind / Maybe it’s a fact we all should face / Everyone makes judgments based on 
race.”).  For more sobering data, see Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 7, at 956, 958 tbl.2 
(finding that “any non-African American subgroup of the United States population will 
reveal high proportions of persons showing statistically noticeable implicit race bias in favor 
of [European-Americans] relative to [African-Americans]”). 
148 See Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in 
PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 61, 62 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner 
eds., 1986) (noting that many white Americans will “sympathize with the victims of past 
injustice . . . [and] regard themselves as nonprejudiced and nondiscriminatory; but, almost 
unavoidably, possess negative feelings and beliefs about blacks”).  Gaertner and Dovidio 
contend that these beliefs “are typically excluded from awareness.”  Id. 
149 See Page, supra note 121, at 211–12.  Page argues that “[u]sing race or sex for the 
initial categorization is likely particularly frequent in a situation like voir dire, where there is 
generally little beyond race and sex on which an attorney could make an initial 
categorization.”  Id. at 212; see also Kang & Lane, supra note 8, at 469 (“[R]ace and 
ethnicity are highly salient and chronically accessible categories.”). 
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new and unique individuals in terms of old and general beliefs is certainly 
among the handiest tools in the social perceiver’s kit.”150 
In the past decade, research using the Implicit Association Test has 
shown that implicit biases are both pervasive and widespread,151 with the 
result that many Americans show automatic preference for white over 
black.152  But Batson rests on outdated and inaccurate assumptions about 
human behavior—assumptions that were recognized as problematic even at 
the time.  As early as his Batson concurrence, Justice Marshall recognized 
the flaws in its framework: “A prosecutor’s own conscious or unconscious 
racism may lead him easily to the conclusion that a prospective black juror 
is ‘sullen,’ or ‘distant,’ a characterization that would not have come to his 
mind if a white juror had acted identically,” he warned.153  “A judge’s own 
conscious or unconscious racism may lead him to accept such an 
explanation as well supported.”154  His observations only have more support 
today. 
Studies in the emerging field of implicit social cognition, an area that 
draws on social psychology, cognitive psychology, and cognitive 
neuroscience, have revealed that “[w]e are not perceptually, cognitively, or 
 
150 Daniel T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of Thinking: Activation and 
Application of Stereotypic Beliefs, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 509, 509 (1991) 
(citations omitted). 
151 See Kang & Lane, supra note 8, at 473.  The Implicit Association Test (IAT) is 
constructed “to assess the strength of associations between target categories (e.g., black 
persons vs. white persons) and attribute categories (e.g., negative vs. positive), both arranged 
on bipolar dimensions.”  Sarah Teige-Mocigemba et al., A Practical Guide to Implicit 
Association Tests and Related Tasks, in HANDBOOK OF IMPLICIT SOCIAL COGNITION: 
MEASUREMENT, THEORY, AND APPLICATIONS 117, 118 (Bertram Gawronski & B. Keith 
Payne eds., 2010).  On the hypothesis that people will “find it easier to associate pleasant 
words with white faces and names than with African-American faces and names,” 
researchers define implicit bias against African-Americans “as faster responses when the 
‘black’ and ‘unpleasant’ categories are paired than when the ‘black’ and ‘pleasant’ 
categories are paired.”  Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 969, 971 (2006). 
 At the Project Implicit website, anyone can take an Implicit Association Test to measure 
implicit attitudes across a range of topics, including race, gender, age, sexual orientation, and 
religion.  See Take a Test, PROJECT IMPLICIT, http://goo.gl/6MvxDo (last visited Dec. 6, 
2013); see also Kang & Lane, supra note 8, at 473.  There are currently more than seven 
million completed tests, making Project Implicit the largest available database of social 
cognition data.  See id. 
152 FAQs, PROJECT IMPLICIT, http://goo.gl/9RpwX4 (last visited Dec. 6, 2013).  The site 
suggests that “Automatic White preference may be common among Americans because of 
the deep learning of negative associations to the group Black in this society.” 
153 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
154 Id.  
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behaviorally colorblind.”155  Instead, the research shows that “most of us 
have implicit biases against racial minorities notwithstanding sincere self-
reports to the contrary.”156  But what is most striking about these findings is 
the wide dissociative gap between what we believe our feelings to be and 
what they actually are.  We want others to see us, and we want to think of 
ourselves, as unbiased and open-minded.157  This motivation is powerful, 
sometimes to the extent that people deny that race matters to them or that 
they even noticed race.158 
Therefore, even if we put aside the incentives created by the adversary 
system, asking lawyers to identify their own implicit biases is “at best 
uninformative and at worst misleading.”159  If a lawyer is unaware of how a 
juror’s race has affected her decision to strike, she will be unable to explain 
it.  Conversely, if she is aware that race informed her decision to strike, she 
will have the double incentive of not losing the strike by admitting that race 
was a factor and the generally shared desire not to appear racially biased.  
As commentators have noted in the employment discrimination context: 
 
155 Kang & Lane, supra note 8, at 468.  Nor does the Constitution require us to be, as 
Alschuler points out: “Americans are not color-blind.  They cannot be.  The Constitution 
does not require them to pretend to be.  The Constitution requires only that the government 
not stigmatize or otherwise disadvantage people on the basis of race . . . .”  Alschuler, Racial 
Quotas, supra note 107, at 743. 
156 Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1490 (2005).  Some 
social psychologists have referred to this conflict as “aversive racism.”  See John F. Dovidio 
et al., Contemporary Racial Bias: When Good People Do Bad Things, in THE SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF GOOD AND EVIL 141, 143–44 (Arthur G. Miller ed., 2004) (“A critical 
aspect of the aversive racism framework is the conflict between the denial of personal 
prejudice and the underlying unconscious negative feelings and beliefs.”). 
157 See Michael I. Norton et al., Casuistry and Social Category Bias, 87 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 817, 819 (2004) (noting widely documented finding that “[i]n addition to this 
desire to appear unbiased to others, people are also motivated to view themselves as unbiased”). 
158 See id. (“White Americans, for example, can be motivated to appear nonprejudiced 
toward Blacks and even to avoid acknowledging the possibility that they may have negative 
attitudes towards Blacks.” (internal citations omitted)).  In various studies, researchers found 
that white people “resist admitting that they have even noticed race during social interaction, 
much less that race has affected their judgment.”  Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, 
Race and Jury Selection: Psychological Perspectives on the Peremptory Challenge Debate, 
63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 527, 532 (2008) [hereinafter Sommers & Norton, Race and Jury 
Selection] (internal citation omitted).  This idea was nicely lampooned in the HBO comedy 
Girls, in which the white protagonist, attempting to break up with her boyfriend, who is 
black, tells him, “I never thought about the fact that you were black once!”—to his evident 
skepticism.  Girls: I Get Ideas (HBO television broadcast Jan. 20, 2013).  Stephen Colbert 
has been having fun with this concept for some time as well.  “I don’t see race,” he once told 
his audience.  The Colbert Report 0:50–0:51 (Comedy Central television broadcast Nov. 2, 
2006), available at http://goo.gl/Zp7ziw.  “People tell me I’m white and I believe them, 
because I own a lot of Jimmy Buffett albums.”  Id. 
159 Sommers & Norton, Race and Jury Selection, supra note 158, at 532. 
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Even if people want to conform their behavior to the norms underlying 
antidiscrimination law, full compliance with the law’s prescriptions is unlikely if the 
relevant legal doctrines fail to capture accurately how and why discrimination occurs, 
how targets respond to it, and what can be done to prevent it from occurring.160 
None of this should give us any comfort that Batson is a meaningful way of 
identifying bias or helping judges to determine the “real reasons” for any 
strike. 
Caught between the need to zealously represent their clients and the 
edicts of the Supreme Court, many lawyers are tempted to lie to the court or 
to themselves.  This is not hard to do, either doctrinally, because the race-
neutral reasons do not have to be “persuasive, or even plausible,”161 or 
psychologically, as “[r]esearch suggests that people are remarkably facile at 
generating neutral explanations to justify biased judgments.”162  This results 
in widespread use of casuistry, defined as “specious reasoning in the service 
of justifying questionable behavior.”163 
This behavior was illustrated in a recent study by social psychologists 
Samuel Sommers and Michael Norton, in which they created a jury 
selection scenario in a hypothetical case.  In the scenario, the defendant was 
charged with robbery and aggravated assault; the prosecution’s case relied 
heavily on DNA evidence.164  Sommers and Norton asked participants165 to 
assume the role of a prosecutor exercising her final peremptory strike and 
choose between two prospective jurors whose profiles—which included 
familiarity with police misconduct for one, skepticism about statistical 
evidence for the other—were designed to be equally unattractive to the 
prosecution.166  To test the effects of race on the decision, in one condition, 
 
160 Krieger & Fiske, supra note 5, at 1001. 
161 Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995). 
162 Sommers & Norton, Race and Jury Selection, supra note 158, at 532; see also 
Melilli, supra note 13, at 448, 461 (reviewing all reported cases from the time Batson was 
decided in 1986 through 1993 and finding that prosecutors were able to give an adequate 
race-neutral reason nearly 80% of the time).  This result was predicted by Justice Marshall in 
his Batson concurrence.  See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., 
concurring) (“Any prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror, 
and trial courts are ill equipped to second-guess those reasons.”). 
163 Norton et al., supra note 157, at 817. 
164 Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral 
Justifications: Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge 
Procedure, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261, 265 (2007) [hereinafter Sommers & Norton, Race-
Based Judgments]. 
165 The participants included ninety college students, eighty-one law students, and 
twenty-eight practicing lawyers.  See id. at 266. 
166 Specifically, the first juror was a journalist who had written articles about police 
misconduct, while the second juror was an executive who was skeptical of statistics.  See 
id. at 265. 
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the first juror was depicted as white and the second juror was depicted as 
black, and in the other condition, the races were reversed.  The study 
showed that participants’ judgments of who to strike varied sharply by race.  
When the first juror was black, “participants challenged him 77% of the 
time; this same individual was challenged just 53% of the time when he was 
White.”167  Similarly, the second juror “was challenged 47% of the time 
when he was Black, compared to 23% when he was White.”168 
 Despite these disparities, the participants “rarely cited race as 
influential, focusing instead on the race-neutral characteristics associated 
with the Black prospective juror.”169  Therefore, 96% of the participants 
“cited as their most important justification” either the first juror’s 
familiarity with police misconduct or the second juror’s skepticism about 
statistics.170  Norton and Sommers concluded that, “even absent awareness 
of the restrictions implemented by Batson, individuals are loath to admit to 
the influence of race.”171  So the chances of a judge being able to divine an 
attorney’s true intent in exercising a strike are remote.  Instead, it may be 
time to subject the entire peremptory challenge inquiry to the scrutiny of 
behavioral realism, whose “only real normative commitment,” write Jerry 
Kang and Kristin Lane, is to stand “against hypocrisy and self-
deception.”172 
C. MISUNDERSTANDING THE ATTORNEY’S ROLE 
Another Batson weakness is that it systematically underestimates the 
professional motivations of attorneys.  Trial lawyers, faced with the choice 
 
167 Id. at 267.  
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 269. 
170 Id. at 268.  This was consistent with the findings of a similar experiment that set up a 
hypothetical college admissions task where participants were asked to choose between two 
candidates for college admission, one with a higher GPA, and the other with more Advanced 
Placement classes.  See Norton et al., supra note 157, at 823.  The researchers varied the race 
of the candidates to see whether the participants favored the black candidates, regardless of 
qualifications.  They found that “[w]hen making a choice between two equally attractive 
college candidates, participants overwhelmingly selected Black candidates and justified this 
decision by inflating the importance of whichever qualification [GPA or number of 
Advanced Placement classes] favored the Black candidate.”  Id. at 824.  Effectively, the 
participants were favoring black candidates “while masking the true reason for that 
preference.”  Id. at 823. 
171 Sommers & Norton, Race-Based Judgments, supra note 164, at 270. 
172 Kang & Lane, supra note 8, at 491 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
As they observe, “The law implicitly adopts some folk-psychology model of human 
behavior and decisionmaking in order to apportion responsibility and incentivize behaviors.  
But garbage in (i.e., incorrect models of the mind) will produce garbage out (i.e., unfair and 
inefficient rules and policies).”  Id. 
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between protecting their clients’ interests and upholding some vague 
constitutional mandate, routinely choose the former.173  David Baldus, after 
conducting a meticulous empirical study of 317 capital murder trials in 
Philadelphia between 1981 and 1997, found that prosecutors in capital cases 
overwhelmingly struck black jurors and defense counsel overwhelmingly 
struck white jurors.174  He concluded that, “in Batson, the United States 
 
173 The paradigmatic expression of this view was summed up by former Philadelphia 
homicide prosecutor Jack McMahon in a 1987 jury selection training video.  See Videotape: 
Jury Selection with Jack McMahon (DATV Prods. 1987) (on file with the Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology).  On the tape, McMahon tells young prosecutors that the 
case law says that the object of jury selection “is to get a competent, fair, and impartial jury.  
Well, that’s ridiculous. . . .  You’re there to win . . . and the only way you’re going to do 
your best is to get jurors that are as unfair and more likely to convict than anybody else in 
that room.”  Id.  Conversely, 
the blacks from the low-income areas are less likely to convict.  It’s just, I understand 
it.  It’s [an] understandable proposition.  There is a resentment for law enforcement, 
there’s a resentment for authority and, as a result, you don’t want those people on 
your jury.  And it may appear as if you’re being racist or whatnot, but, again, you are 
just being realistic.  You’re just trying to win the case. 
Id.  Because he is so focused on winning cases, McMahon disparages attempts to comply 
with equal protection:  
If you go in there and any one of you think you’re going to be some noble civil 
libertarian and try to get jurors, “well, he says that he can be fair; I’ll go with him,” 
that’s ridiculous.  You’ll lose; you’ll be out of the office; you’ll be doing corporate 
law.  Because that’s what will happen.  You’re there to win. 
Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 113, at 1079 (quoting Videotape: Jury Selection with Jack 
McMahon, supra). 
174 See Baldus et al., supra note 3, at 10, 63 tbl.5.  Baldus and colleagues found a strong 
difference in strike rates among subgroups, finding that prosecutors overwhelmingly 
disfavored young black men (strike rates of .61) and young black women (.63) as well as 
mid-age black women (.49) and older black women (.48).  Defense counsel primarily 
targeted older nonblack men (.65), mid-age nonblack men (.58), older nonblack women 
(.55), and young nonblack men (.54).  See id.  Conversely, the study found that, for both 
parties, the strike rates of older black men and young nonblack women were near the average 
rate, “suggesting indifference.”  Id. at 62.  Nor can these patterns be described as irrational, 
because empirical evidence has shown repeatedly that there are “differential attitudes and 
beliefs of black and non-black jurors that are highly relevant to trial guilt and death-
sentencing outcomes.”  Id. at 17.  More recently, a study of prosecutorial strike patterns in 
North Carolina capital trials over a twenty-year period found that “prosecutors struck eligible 
black venire members at about 2.5 times the rate they struck eligible venire members who 
were not black.”  Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The 
Overwhelming Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina 
Capital Trials, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1531, 1533 (2012).  Moreover, “[t]hese disparities remained 
consistent over time and across the state, and did not diminish when we controlled for 
information about venire members that potentially bore on the decision to strike them, such 
as views on the death penalty or prior experience with crime.”  Id. at 1533–34.  Grosso and 
O’Brien also noted a study conducted by journalists at the Dallas Morning News, which 
focused on 108 noncapital felony cases in Dallas County, Texas, in 2002.  See id. at 1539–40 
(citing Steve McGonigle et al., Striking Differences: A Process of Juror Elimination, DALL. 
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Supreme Court completely misunderstood the conviction of both 
prosecutors and defense counsel that race and gender discrimination are 
rational, ethical, and necessary strategies to protect the interests of their 
clients.”175 
At trial, a lawyer’s foremost obligation is to her client.176  For lawyers 
committed to defending their clients with “devotion and zeal,”177 Batson 
represents a roadblock to single-minded advocacy.  Faced with the 
immediate obligation of representing a client facing the loss of liberty or 
even life, they do not have the time or inclination “to fight cultural 
stereotypes unless they are being used against [their] client.”178  Indeed, 
some may believe that their duty to their clients is so strong that, as one 
lawyer argued, it would be “unethical for a defense lawyer to disregard 
what is known about the influence of race and sex on juror attitudes in order 
to comply with Batson v. Kentucky and its progeny.”179 
Justice O’Connor acknowledged the difficult position in which the 
Batson doctrine places attorneys.  “We know that like race, gender matters,” 
she wrote, concurring in J.E.B. v. Alabama.180  “[O]ne need not be a sexist 
to share the intuition that in certain cases a person’s gender and resulting 
life experience will be relevant to his or her view of the case.”181  But the 
Court’s decision “severely limit[ed] a litigant’s ability to act on this 
intuition.”182  Instead, the Court had decreed that “any correlation between a 
juror’s gender and attitudes is irrelevant as a matter of constitutional law.  
But to say that gender makes no difference as a matter of law is not to say 
that gender makes no difference as a matter of fact.”183  The same is true for 
race—studies have shown that juror race can have an impact on trial 
outcomes, particularly for nonwhite defendants.184  So the Court’s 
 
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 21, 2005, at 1A).  “The journalists concluded that being black was the 
most important personal trait affecting which jurors prosecutors rejected.”  Id. at 1540 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
175 Baldus et al., supra note 3, at 124. 
176 See, e.g., Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 184 
(1983) (noting the criminal defense “tradition of unmitigated devotion to the client’s interest”). 
177 Abbe Smith, “Nice Work if You Can Get It”: “Ethical” Jury Selection in Criminal 
Defense, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 529 (1998). 
178 Id. at 529–30. 
179 Id. at 531.  This view appears to be shared by many trial lawyers.  See, e.g., William 
F. Fahey, Peremptory Challenges: A Crucial Tool for Trial Lawyers, 12 CRIM. JUST. 24, 26 
(1997) (“[W]hen I represent a client to the best of my ability, my job is to win—not to 
become part of the latest social experiment to improve community relations.”). 
180 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 148 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
181 Id. at 149. 
182 Id.  
183 Id. 
184 See supra note 175. 
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insistence that race cannot legally be a consideration puts lawyers in an 
impossible position.  And when voir dire is limited, lawyers are even more 
likely to rely, at least in part, on stereotypes.185 
Therefore, there is a double incentive for lawyers to mask any effect of 
race in their decisions to challenge particular jurors—both the Batson line 
of cases and psychological pressures.  Above all, lawyers want to win, 
particularly at trial, where the stakes are highest.  As one trial lawyer 
admitted, once the burden shifts to him to justify a peremptory strike, “then 
you are tempted to engage in that thing which is absolutely horrible: lying 
in a courtroom.  You have an ethical duty to be candid to the court, and yet 
we all know that pretext is the name of the game here.”186  The end result is 
that it is “highly unlikely that many attorneys will cite race in justifying 
peremptories, even if they are aware of its influence.”187  Ultimately, as one 
attorney suggested, the Batson analysis does not seem to be honest, given 
the fact that there may not be “any such thing as a racially neutral 
‘anything’ in America.”188 
D. BATSON’S FAILURE TO REMEDY THE EXCLUSION OF MINORITIES 
FROM JURIES 
It is therefore unsurprising that Batson’s signal failure has been its 
inability to eliminate racial discrimination in jury selection.  There is little 
dispute that in 1986, when Batson was decided, peremptory challenges 
were widely misused.189  Unfortunately, these patterns are not all in the 
past.  One study of jury selection procedures in eight Southern states 
revealed counties where prosecutors “excluded nearly 80% of African-
 
185 The psychological literature suggests that, while reliance on stereotypes is diminished 
when more factors are at play, “[s]tereotypes are particularly likely to affect judgments that 
are based on limited information, made under cognitive load, and hurried by time pressure, 
all apt descriptions of typical voir dire.”  Sommers & Norton, Race and Jury Selection, supra 
note 158, at 530 (internal citations omitted). 
186 Brown, supra note 105, at 1209; see also Fahringer, supra note 2, at 117 (noting that 
jury selection generally “involves some guile on the part of lawyers.  Lawyers announce to 
the panel that they want only jurors who will decide the case impartially, while, in fact, they 
want partisan jurors.”). 
187 Sommers & Norton, Race and Jury Selection, supra note 158, at 532. 
188 Brown, supra note 105, at 1204. 
189 Justice Marshall, in his concurrence in Batson, collected a list of cases showing strike 
rates against black jurors of around 70% to 80%.  See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 
103–04 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).  Similar phenomena were noted by the Eleventh 
Circuit in Horton v. Zant.  941 F.2d 1449, 1457 (11th Cir. 1991) (discussing prosecutor who, 
between 1974 and 1981, “exercised 1,580 peremptory strikes, 1,095 of them (70%) against 
black venire members”).  In cases where the defendant was black, the prosecutor struck 
nearly 90% of black venire members in capital cases and 85% of black venire members in 
noncapital cases.  See id. at 1458. 
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Americans qualified for jury service.”190  Specifically, the researchers found 
that between 2005 and 2009, prosecutors in Houston County, Alabama, 
used their peremptory strikes to remove 80% of African-American jurors 
from jury venires,191 and in Dallas County, Alabama, prosecutors had used 
157 out of 199 strikes—that is, about 80% of them—against African-
American venire members in the twelve reported cases since Batson.192 
Another study, which focused on 390 felony jury trials in a single 
Louisiana parish between 1994 and 2002, showed that prosecutors struck 
African-American jurors at more than three times the rate they struck white 
jurors.193  In other words, at least in some parts of the country, Batson has 
done little to curb the use of racially based peremptory challenges. 
While the problem is clearly more acute in some jurisdictions than in 
others,194 nonwhite defendants are still convicted today—of serious or even 
capital crimes—by all-white juries due to the use of peremptory 
challenges.195  And if this phenomenon is far less prevalent than it was fifty 
 
190 EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A 
CONTINUING LEGACY 4 (2010), available at http://goo.gl/h9PSve.  The states studied were 
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and 
Tennessee.  See id. 
191 See id. at 14 (citation omitted).  The population of Houston County is about 26% 
African-American.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICK FACTS FOR HOUSTON 
COUNTY, ALABAMA (last revised June 27, 2013), available at http://goo.gl/rwoiQl. 
192 See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 190, at 14.  The population of Dallas County 
is over 69% African-American.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICK FACTS FOR 
DALLAS COUNTY, ALABAMA (last revised June 27, 2013), available at http://goo.gl/IDGGFT. 
193 See RICHARD BOURKE ET AL., LA. CRISIS ASSISTANCE CTR., BLACK STRIKES: A STUDY 
OF THE RACIALLY DISPARATE USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES BY THE JEFFERSON PARISH 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 5, 7 (2003), available at http://goo.gl/NXiJVH.  In the 
eighteen murder trials since Batson in Jefferson Parish that resulted in death sentences and 
where there was a record of juror race, “10 had no black members.  Seven had one.  One had 
two.  None had three.”  Adam Liptak, Oddity in Picking Jurors Opens Door to Racial Bias, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2007, at A12.  This comes out to 4% participation by African-American 
jurors in a parish where the population in 2000 was 23% African-American.  See id. 
194 Louisiana appears to have had more than its share of black defendants convicted by all-
white juries.  See, e.g., State v. Austin, No. 2011 KA 2150, slip op. at 2, 20 (La. Ct. App. June 
8, 2012) (involving a black defendant convicted of a 2009 second-degree murder before an all-
white jury after prosecutor struck two black jurors from the panel); State v. Qualls, 921 So. 2d 
226, 240–42 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (describing how prosecutor used nine of eleven strikes against 
black jurors, resulting in all-white jury); State v. Price, 917 So. 2d 1201, 1210 (La. Ct. App. 
2005) (noting that prosecutor struck all six black jurors from panel in 2003 rape case involving 
black defendant).  This seems in line with the success rate for Batson claims in Louisiana, 
measured in 1993, of just 2.94%.  See Melilli, supra note 13, at 468 tbl.F-4. 
195 See, e.g., State v. Weary, 931 So. 2d 297, 336–37 (La. 2006) (Johnson, J., dissenting) 
(describing the 2002 capital murder trial of a black defendant tried by all-white jury after 
prosecutor struck only black juror left on the venire); Howell v. State, 860 So. 2d 704, 724, 
767 (Miss. 2003) (affirming death sentence of black defendant for 2000 murder tried by an 
all-white jury after prosecutor struck only two black jurors on panel); State v. McFadden, 
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years ago,196 it is arguably due more to changing cultural norms than to any 
improvement brought about by Batson.  If Batson were genuinely curbing 
the race-based use of peremptory challenges, we would probably have 
fewer cases like these: 
 Darryl Batts was convicted of robbery in Kentucky in 2003.  Batts, 
who is African-American, was convicted by an all-white jury.  
While there had been ten prospective African-American jurors on 
his jury panel, five were eliminated by random selection, and the 
prosecutor struck the remaining five.  Nonetheless, the trial court 
found no Batson violation, and Batts was sentenced to fifty years in 
prison.197 
 Ricky Burnette was convicted of sexual assault in Wisconsin in 
2003.  Burnette, who is African-American, was tried before an all-
white jury after the prosecutor struck all three African-American 
jurors (and one Asian-American juror) from the panel.  The trial 
court found no Batson violation.198 
 Lawrence Branch was tried for murder in Mississippi in 2002.  
Branch, who is African-American, was tried before an all-white 
jury after the prosecutor struck the only three African-American 
prospective jurors on the venire.  The trial court found no Batson 
violation and Branch was convicted and sentenced to death.199 
 
216 S.W.3d 673, 674, 678 (Mo. 2007) (reversing conviction and death sentence for black 
defendant tried by all-white jury for 2003 murder after prosecutor struck four black jurors 
and one Asian juror from panel); State v. Carter, 711 S.E.2d 515, 519, 522, 524 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2011) (affirming 2010 second-degree murder conviction of black defendant where 
prosecutor struck only two black jurors on a panel and the jury seated was all-white); State v. 
Saintcalle, No. 86257-5, slip op. at 1, 24–27 (Wash. Aug. 1, 2013) (affirming 2009 
conviction of black defendant for felony murder by all-white jury after prosecutor 
peremptorily struck only black juror on venire). 
196 In researching trials that had taken place since January 1, 2000, I found seventy-five 
cases in which defendants, who had been convicted by all-white juries, raised Batson claims 
on appeal.  Of those defendants, fifty-two were African-American, three were Hispanic, four 
were white, one was Asian-American, one was Native-American, and fifteen could not be 
determined.  See All-White Jury Spreadsheet (on file with the Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology).  An additional twelve defendants claimed that they had been tried before all-
white juries, but their contentions could not be verified.  See id. 
197 See Batts v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-SC-000364-MR, 2005 WL 3500779, at *2, 
*4, *6 (Ky. Jan. 26, 2006). 
198 State v. Burnette, No. 2004AP2754-CR, 2005 WL 3466532, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Dec. 20, 2005). 
199 Branch v. Epps, 844 F. Supp. 2d 762, 766–67, 778–79 (N.D. Miss. 2011).  Although 
his Batson claim was unsuccessful, Branch’s death sentence was vacated on grounds of 
mental retardation.  See id. at 773. 
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These cases echo the long history of racial discrimination in American 
justice and belie the notion that we live in a post-racial world.200  But all-
white juries are not problematic just because they are symbolically 
disturbing.201  Empirical evidence suggests that they do a worse job than 
racially diverse juries.  In a study comparing racially mixed mock juries and 
all-white mock juries, researchers found that racially mixed juries tended to 
deliberate longer and discuss more information, made fewer factual errors, 
and were less resistant to discussions of race than all-white juries.202  As a 
result, defendants tried by all-white juries are more likely to be found guilty 
than those tried before more diverse juries.203  For black defendants in 
capital cases, all-white juries correspond with more likely imposition of the 
death penalty.204  A study of 340 capital trials in fourteen states found that 
the presence of one or more black men on the jury was markedly associated 
 
200 Kang & Lane, supra note 8, at 519.  “In a post-civil rights era, in what some people 
exuberantly embrace as a post-racial era, many assume that we already live in a colorblind 
society,” they write.  Id.  But “[t]he data force us to see through the facile assumptions of 
colorblindness.”  Id. at 520. 
201 See Alschuler, Racial Quotas, supra note 107, at 704 (observing that all-white juries 
“evoke disturbing images of American criminal justice”).  Alschuler notes that, in the many 
communities where all-white juries are mistrusted, “the mistrust has deep historical roots.”  
Id. at 707. 
202 See Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying 
Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 597, 608 (2006).  Sommers concluded that “arguments in favor of diversity need not 
focus exclusively on righting historical wrongs or providing equal access for members of 
underrepresented social categories,” but could instead be supported by data suggesting that 
“racial heterogeneity can have observable decision-making benefits for groups as a whole and 
can also lead majority individuals to demonstrate improved performance.”  Id. 
203 Longitudinal studies of trials show a relationship between probability of conviction 
and the number of black jurors with increased black representation on juries corresponding 
with a decline in felony convictions.  See JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: 
OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 375–76, 378–79 (1977) 
(showing a decline of approximately 10% in felony convictions in Baltimore following a 
change in jury selection procedure that increased black representation).  In 1969 in 
Baltimore, jury commissioners changed from “selecting jurors from the lists of property 
owners—which meant older, richer, whiter juries—to taking them randomly from the voter 
registration list.”  Id. at 33.  This sharply increased black representation on juries, from 
approximately 30% before 1969 to 46.7% in 1973.  See id.  “The rate of conviction,” reports 
Van Dyke, “which between 1965 and 1969 had averaged about 83.6 percent in Baltimore’s 
jury trials, dropped to about 65.3 percent during the first few months after the switch and 
remained below 70 percent during the next several years.”  Id.  In the Central District of Los 
Angeles, criminal convictions declined from 67% to 47% from 1969 to 1971 after the 
District’s method of jury selection substantially increased black representation on juries.  See 
id. at 377, 380. 
204 See William J. Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 
189, 192 tbl.1, panels B & C (2001). 
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with lower death sentencing rates for black defendants.  In cases in which 
the victim was black, jurors imposed the death penalty 66.7% of the time 
when the jury included no black men versus 42.9% of the time when the 
jury included one or more black men.205  In cases in which the victim was 
white, jurors imposed the death penalty 71.9% of the time when the jury 
had no black men, but only 42.9% of the time if the jury included one black 
man and 36.4% of the time when the jury included two black men.206  The 
most recent study, of 785 felony jury trials in Florida between 2000 and 
2010,207 showed that juries drawn from all-white pools were more likely to 
convict black defendants than white defendants; when one or more black 
prospective jurors were included in the pool, the conviction rates for black 
and white defendants were nearly identical.208 
Not every instance of an all-white jury is due to the discriminatory use 
of peremptory challenges—there remains an abiding issue with assembling 
jury pools that can lead to serious underrepresentation.209  Indeed, the more 
pervasive problem may be that many African-Americans never make it to 
the courthouse in the first place, that instead they are, as one judge 
observed, “consistently and pervasively underrepresented in [her 
jurisdiction’s] juries, from one year, and one jury wheel, to the next.”210  
But to the extent that the exclusion of African-American and minority 
jurors is also due to the use of peremptory challenges, it is fair to ask 
whether Batson has been effective at remedying the matter.  And the data 
suggest that Batson has had surprisingly little effect.  In the Baldus study of 
317 capital murder trials in Philadelphia between 1981 and 1997,211 a 
 
205 Id. at 192 tbl.1, panel C. 
206 Id. at 192 tbl.1, panel B. 
207 See Anwar et al., supra note 16, at 1017, 1027. 
208 “When there are no potential black jurors in the pool, black defendants are 
significantly more likely than whites to be convicted of at least one crime (81% for blacks 
versus 66% for whites).”  Id. at 1032.  Conversely, the researchers found, if there was at least 
one black juror in the pool, conviction rates became “almost identical (71% for blacks and 
73% for whites).”  Id. 
209 See Nina W. Chernoff, Wrong About the Right: How Courts Undermine the Fair 
Cross-Section Guarantee by Confusing It With Equal Protection, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 141, 
145–46 & n.18 (2012) (arguing that, despite the consistently low level of successful fair-
cross-section claims, “research demonstrates—just as consistently—that African-Americans 
and Hispanics are underrepresented in jury systems across the count[r]y”).  As one First 
Circuit judge wrote, “[T]he true distortion of ‘reality’ is the failure of a criminal law system, 
before which is tried a large number of persons from an ethnic group, to include within its 
mechanisms the peers of those charged, at least in some reasonable measured proportion to 
their membership in the population.”  United States v. Pion, 25 F.3d 18, 27 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(Torruella, J., concurring). 
210 United States v. Bates, No. 05-81027, 2009 WL 5033928, at *17 (E.D. Mich. 
Dec. 15, 2009). 
211 See Baldus et al., supra note 3, at 10. 
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period of time that included the five years before Batson, researchers found 
that the “Supreme Court decisions banning these practices [of racially 
motivated strikes] appear to have had only a marginal impact.”212 
III. NEGOTIATING PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
This Article proposes a way out of the current impasse.  Negotiating 
peremptory challenges preserves the original values of the peremptory 
challenge while offering litigants an effective bulwark against its misuse.  
And it can achieve those ends using simple negotiation skills that are part of 
every lawyer’s arsenal.  If effective, this method would do away with 
cumbersome and ineffective Batson procedures, maintain party control of 
the process, preserve dignity for all participants, and be more effective at 
blocking attempts to purge juries of minorities. 
A. THE MECHANICS OF THE PROPOSAL 
The procedure for negotiating challenges contemplates that voir dire 
would proceed as usual, and then the parties would exercise all of their 
challenges for cause, leaving a panel of qualified jurors.213  This panel 
would be seated sequentially, resulting in an identifiable “first twelve” 
jurors.214  If any one of the first twelve were struck peremptorily, they 
would be replaced by the next juror in the venire.215  Once presented with a 
slate of qualified jurors, the parties would be allowed a set amount of time 
to negotiate peremptory strikes.216  If the parties failed to agree, the first 
twelve jurors would be empaneled.217 
 
212 Id. 
213 The size of this panel would probably be close to the qualified panels used currently, 
which correspond to the number of jurors needed plus the number of strikes allotted to each 
side—usually somewhere on the order of thirty jurors. 
214 This assumes that the jurisdiction would use twelve jurors.  In certain jurisdictions, 
the panel might be smaller.  See supra note 24. 
215 This practice would correspond to that in a sequential strike system, where the 
prospective jurors are seated in order so that the parties know who would be next on the panel 
if someone is struck.  Some jurisdictions follow a struck juror system where if a juror is struck, 
he could be replaced by any other juror remaining in the venire.  This system would add an 
extra layer of uncertainty to the negotiations, making a sequential system preferable. 
216 I envisage this “negotiation window” as being approximately thirty minutes, slightly 
longer than the time a judge would ordinarily allow for the parties to decide how to exercise 
their peremptory strikes.  While some judges, particularly in the state system, only give 
litigants a couple of minutes to decide on their strikes and might be reluctant to commit half 
an hour or more to negotiation, they might be swayed by the prospect of never having to 
adjudicate a Batson issue again. 
217 This proposal, in its simplest form, contemplates a single-defendant trial.  In a multiple 
defendant trial, negotiation would need to be conducted in two stages—one for defense counsel 
to agree on a strategy and the other for counsel to negotiate with the prosecution.  Multi-
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Negotiation, then, would likely proceed along four possible lines.  The 
first scenario, which seems likely to be the most common, can best be 
described as horse-trading.  Under this scenario, the parties would “trade” 
the perceived most pro-prosecution juror for the perceived most pro-defense 
juror, then the next most pro-prosecution juror for the next most pro-
defense juror, and so on.  In negotiation terms, this scenario would be a 
compromise, where each side would “give in somewhat to find a common 
ground.”218  In many ways, this would not be dissimilar to the peremptory 
strike system used now—both the “flower child” and the police officer’s 
brother likely would be mutually struck, leaving fewer strongly partisan 
jurors on the panel in favor of more seemingly neutral ones.  But there is an 
important difference in that parties can stop negotiating before all members 
of any groups they wish to preserve are eliminated from the jury panel.  
Any numerical disparities in the number of favorable jurors for either side 
would therefore be less outcome determinative.219 
The second scenario, in which parties might actually agree to 
challenge particular jurors, is more aspirational.  If an oddball juror was on 
the initial panel—one “whose statements provide no basis for exclusion but 
whose manner seems erratic”220 and who seemed unattractive both to the 
prosecution and to the defense—the parties might cooperate.  If both parties 
agreed on removal, they could exclude the potentially disruptive juror on 
consent without “expending” a challenge they might prefer to reserve for a 
juror who seemed unfavorable to them specifically.  In negotiation terms, 
this would be a collaborative strategy, where the outcome of the negotiation 
would maximize the outcomes for both parties.221  The rest of the strikes 
would likely be the product of the compromise scenario described above. 
The third scenario might occur if the parties decided that it would be in 
their best interests to exercise their peremptory challenges as usual and then 
simply present their joint list to the judge, thereby evading the negotiation 
rules (and Batson to boot).  In this evasion scenario, the parties could 
simply take the entire panel of qualified jurors and make alternate strikes 
 
defendant negotiations could raise a number of additional issues, including disagreement 
among defense counsel, whether the refusal of one to negotiate would bind the others, and so 
forth.  The resolution of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article. 
218 Roy J. Lewicki et al., Selecting a Strategy, in NEGOTIATION: READINGS, EXERCISES, 
AND CASES 14, 17 (Roy J. Lewicki et al. eds., 5th ed. 2007) (describing the compromising, or 
“split-the-difference,” strategy). 
219 This would give the parties more effective power to “cancel out” each other’s strikes 
and achieve something closer to parity.  Cf. supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text. 
220 Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury, supra note 29, at 206.  These jurors are 
sometimes referred to as “three dollar bills.”  Id. 
221 See Lewicki et al., supra note 218, at 22–23 (describing collaborative, or “win-win,” 
strategy). 
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until they were left with twelve jurors.  The negotiation between the parties 
would be limited to an agreement to disregard the rules and simply exercise 
their strikes.  Such a result would effectively mimic a peremptory strike 
regime, albeit with less judicial oversight and with both parties effectively 
forgoing any Batson claims.  While it might be the least desirable scenario 
from the point of view of the excluded jurors, the scenario is not much 
different from situations in which the parties exercise their strikes and 
simply do not raise Batson claims.  In addition, a lawyer with a stake in 
retaining one or more jurors on the initial panel might be less likely to make 
such an agreement.  A strength of this proposed negotiation system is that it 
makes no peremptory strikes the default option instead of relying on 
attorneys to overcome the inertia and diffidence that might prevent them 
from raising a Batson objection.222  Attorneys therefore would have to 
consider whether they actually want to agree to a blanket authorization of 
all of their opponents’ strikes to trigger this scenario. 
A fourth scenario could be termed “refusal to play.”  If one participant 
decided that he was happy with the panel as it was, he could simply refuse 
to negotiate, forcing his counterpart to accept the first twelve jurors.  This 
would unilaterally end the process and would result in no peremptory 
challenges being exercised by either side.  This result would be tantamount 
to abolishing peremptory challenges on a case-by-case basis at the instance 
of the parties. 
No matter which scenario or combination of scenarios the parties 
followed in their negotiation, a useful feature of the system would be to 
have the parties jointly present their agreed-upon strikes to the court.  
Having the parties agree to a list of jurors to be peremptorily struck would 
be similar to handing the judge a stipulation.  Not only would a list resolve 
the issue of who would ultimately constitute the jury panel, but it would 
also function as a certification that the parties had waived their Batson 
rights.223  In a sense, this is an open way of doing what is ordinarily 
accomplished by silence when attorneys fail to raise Batson objections.  
The proposal contemplates that, similar to a stipulation, the judge would 
accept the list as agreed to by the parties unless she had good cause to reject 
 
222 A recognized cognitive bias is the “status quo” bias, which “refers to the tendency to 
value the status quo over other options, even when those options increase individual 
welfare.”  Adam S. Zimmerman, Funding Irrationality, 59 DUKE L.J. 1105, 1134–36 (2010) 
(citing William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. 
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 19 (1988)). 
223 While a defendant would be foreclosed from relitigating that waiver, he might be able 
to claim ineffective assistance of counsel during the negotiation process. 
2014] NEGOTIATING PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 45 
it.224  Once the list is accepted by the judge and the challenged jurors are 
excused, there would be no further inquiry into the process.  The defendant 
would lose the opportunity to raise jury selection issues on appeal except as 
part of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
B. THE BENEFITS OF A NEGOTIATION MODEL 
Negotiating peremptory challenges offers a number of benefits.  One is 
clarity: If no resolution is reached, the parties are left with the first twelve 
jurors on the panel.  A second benefit is ease of implementation.  Lawyers 
negotiate all the time—over discovery, during plea bargaining, for 
exclusion of time.  Even if a case goes to trial, there are numerous 
procedural aspects to be worked out.  Third, negotiation is likely to protect 
many of the interests at stake in the jury selection process: autonomy, 
parity, and the possibility of enhanced community participation.  While it 
might seem counterintuitive to propose a system of negotiated consent at 
the beginning of a trial, perhaps the paradigmatic adversarial experience, 
the proposal is not as radical as it might appear.  Vindication of jurors’ 
equal protection rights depends overwhelmingly on a party’s decision to 
raise those rights, thus negotiation is not that great a departure from the 
current system. 
1. Curbing the Use of Race-Based Peremptories 
 Unlike Batson, which requires the affirmative step of raising a 
challenge to an opponent’s strike, the negotiation model, by its very 
structure, would put the parties in a position of having no challenges at all if 
there is no agreement.  By simply having to consent, lawyers and their 
clients would be forced to consider whether a proposed strike helps or hurts 
their prospects.  If the strike seemed unfavorable, they would have to assess 
whether there is a complementary strike that would even the scales.  The 
cognitive biases that might prevent a party from raising a Batson challenge 
or prevent a judge from finding a violation would therefore be tempered by 
the necessity of making a conscious choice. 
In addition, litigants would have the power to block race-based strikes 
if they so desired.  In any situation where there were at least some nonwhite 
jurors on the initial panel, there would be considerably less risk that they 
 
224 This is a similar standard to that used by courts when contemplating stipulations of 
fact between the parties.  As a rule the courts “will enforce stipulations if such stipulations 
are reasonable, are not against good morals or sound public policy, are within the general 
scope of the case made by the pleadings, and are in such form as may be required by rule of 
court or statute.”  ROBERT S. HUNTER, FEDERAL TRIAL HANDBOOK: CIVIL § 21.4 (4th ed. 
2005).  Moreover, “It is generally considered that stipulations which tend to expedite the trial 
should be enforced unless good cause is shown to the contrary.”  Id. 
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would all be struck.  As an example, consider a situation similar to that of 
Ricky Burnette, mentioned above, who faced an all-white jury after three 
African-American jurors and one Asian-American juror were struck from 
the venire.225  Under the Batson regime, Burnette had relatively little 
agency—even if he raised an objection, he could not ensure that the judge 
would find a violation and disallow the strikes.  But in negotiation, Burnette 
and his attorney would have a veto power.  They could judge for 
themselves whether they wanted to keep the panel as constituted or agree to 
a certain number of strikes in exchange for strikes of their own.  If it was 
important to Burnette and his counsel to retain an African-American 
presence on the jury, and there were African-American jurors in the first 
twelve, they could simply refuse to let them go.226  They might agree to the 
strikes of one or even two of the African-American jurors in exchange for 
strikes of white jurors who seemed particularly prosecution-friendly.  But as 
a matter of self-interest—assuming that both sides believed that juror race 
might be significant to the outcome of the case—it is implausible that 
Burnette and his attorney would agree to an all-white jury. 
Even if the first twelve jurors on the panel were white, the prosecutor 
might still want to trade some challenges when certain prospective jurors 
among the first twelve seemed unfavorable to the prosecution.  If the 
prosecutor refused to negotiate, the defendant would indeed have to go 
ahead with an all-white jury.  But this risk is no greater than the risk that 
would accompany abolishing peremptory challenges, long championed as a 
means of enhancing jury diversity in the aggregate.227  At minimum, the 
homogeneity of the initial panel would be due to random selection rather 
than to the purposeful exclusion of nonwhite jurors. 
2. Fidelity to Original Purposes of the Peremptory Challenge 
As discussed above, the original peremptory challenge was an 
arbitrary and capricious right, designed to give the litigants some control 
over the jury selection process and thereby enhance the acceptability of that 
jury’s verdict for the litigants and the public.  Its greatest virtue was not its 
much-vaunted—though little supported—claim to enhancing impartiality228 
 
225 See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
226 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 177, at 523–26 (describing her representation of a black 
medical student charged with assaulting a white police officer).  For Smith, the calculus was 
simple: “We wanted as many black or Hispanic jurors as we could get.  We exercised all of 
our peremptory challenges to excuse whites.”  Id. at 526. 
227 See supra Part I.D.2. 
228 Impartiality is still frequently invoked as the driving reason for the challenge.  See, 
e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 70 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In the interest of 
promoting the supposedly greater good of race relations in the society as a whole . . . we use 
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but the opportunity for litigants to participate and attain freedom from 
judicial control.  These values are kept intact by a system of negotiating 
peremptory challenges.  Whether the litigant wants to exercise a challenge 
for whimsical or strategic reasons, she has the latitude to do so, without 
needing to make up any justifying reasons.  This latitude is only 
circumscribed by the exercise of her opponent’s own autonomy.229  Each 
party will have to decide, in the circumstances of each case, whether she 
wants to reach a compromise or whether she would rather forego her own 
challenges than allow any opposing challenges. 
3. Ease of Implementation 
Finally, negotiating peremptory challenges employs a process that is 
familiar and easy to understand.  While negotiation permeates all areas of 
lawyering (and, arguably, modern life),230 it has a particularly salient role in 
criminal practice.  In our system, with the overwhelming majority of cases 
resolved by plea bargaining, trials are quite literally exceptional.231  Even 
lawyers who see themselves primarily as litigators spend an enormous 
amount of time negotiating—discussing plea offers, working out deadlines, 
drafting stipulations.  Experienced trial attorneys know that the most 
effective use of their time is to focus on the issues that are really in 
contention and work out everything else.232  According to one trial attorney, 
the lawyers who shrink from such agreements are typically “also the ones 
 
the Constitution to destroy the ages-old right of criminal defendants to exercise peremptory 
challenges as they wish, to secure a jury that they consider fair.”).  Nonetheless, that 
rationale is ultimately unconvincing, as impartiality should properly be the province of the 
challenge for cause.  See supra Part I.B.1. 
229 Negotiation also helps ensure parity among the litigants, a value that Justice Marshall 
recognized was important to prevent abuse.  See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107 
(1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“Our criminal justice system ‘requires not only freedom 
from any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice against his prosecution.  
Between him and the state the scales are to be evenly held.’” (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 
120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887))). 
230 See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES, at xvii (2d ed. 1991) (“Negotiation is a 
fact of life.”). 
231 See Caren Myers Morrison, Jury 2.0, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1579, 1623 (2011) (noting 
that, “[f]or the overwhelming majority of criminal defendants, we have an adversarial system 
in name alone”).  This is one of the reasons that “[c]riminal practice is one of the most 
cooperative practices in all of law.”  Richard Birke, The Role of Trial in Promoting 
Cooperative Negotiation in Criminal Practice, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 39, 41 (2007). 
232 See, e.g., Elliott Wilcox, Sifting the Issues with Stipulations, 44 TRIAL 39, 39 (2008).  
Wilcox describes how, when defending a client charged with attempted murder, he and the 
prosecutor ended up stipulating to almost every material fact in the case.  See id.  The reason 
was simple: “Because we knew the strengths and weaknesses of our cases, we were able to 
identify the true issues that we needed to focus on.  In short, we knew what mattered and, 
more important, what didn’t matter.”  Id. 
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who either don’t understand their cases very well or don’t know how to try 
cases.”233  Unlike, say, cumulative voting, which requires some familiarity 
with the structure of corporate voting, negotiation is a central lawyering 
skill. 
Peremptory challenge negotiation would also take place on a more 
level playing field.  Each side would have autonomy and roughly equal 
bargaining power—a distinct departure from the world of plea bargaining, 
where the prosecution holds almost all the bargaining chips.  Of course, the 
strength of a party’s position will be determined to a large extent by random 
selection.  If the first twelve jurors seem more favorable to one side than the 
other, that side will have an upper hand in negotiation, because its 
alternative to a negotiated agreement is fairly satisfactory.234  But even the 
party in the weaker position can easily calculate whether he would be better 
off accepting the existing panel or agreeing to other terms. 
Nor does the proposal require wholesale adoption throughout the land.  
If necessary, an individual judge could establish negotiation as the rule in 
her courtroom.  Constance Baker Motley, the former federal judge and 
prominent civil rights advocate, decided on her own initiative to bar 
peremptory challenges in her courtroom.235  “[J]udicial experience with 
peremptory challenges proves that they are a cloak for discrimination,” she 
wrote.236  The peremptory challenge, “therefore, should be banned.”237  
Equally, a state’s Supreme Court could experiment with the proposal in a 
limited way, for instance in districts where the racial make-up of the juries 
has consistently proved problematic. 
 
233 Id.  Parties can even occasionally agree on ways to streamline jury selection.  See, 
e.g., Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2900 (2010) (“The parties agreed to exclude, 
in particular, every prospective juror who said that a preexisting opinion about Enron or the 
defendants would prevent her from being impartial.”); Carter v. State, 600 S.E.2d 637, 639 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2004).  In Carter, the parties cross-challenged each other’s strikes on the basis 
of Batson.  In the end, both sides “explicitly waived any Batson objection upon reaching an 
agreement that two jurors originally excluded—a female struck by the defense and an 
African-American struck by the prosecution—would be seated on the jury.  The trial court 
agreed to this remedy, and the two individuals joined the jury.”  Id. 
234 The idea of BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement) was popularized by 
Roger Fisher in the best-selling book Getting to Yes.  See FISHER ET AL., supra note 230, at 
100.  As Fisher explains, “[T]he relative negotiating power of two parties depends primarily 
upon how attractive to each is the option of not reaching agreement,” therefore “[t]he better 
your BATNA, the greater your power.”  Id. at 102. 
235 See Mark Hansen, Peremptory-Free Zone: A Federal Judge Won’t Allow Such 
Challenges in Her Courtroom, 82 A.B.A. J. 26, 26 (1996). 
236 Minetos v. City Univ. of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 177, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).  For a 
discussion of judicial self-help measures in combating racial discrimination in jury selection, 
see Marder, supra note 138, at 1709–12. 
237 Id. 
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C. CRITIQUES AND REBUTTAL 
Any proposal that suggests doing away with a well-entrenched (even if 
much-criticized) system is going to be subject to critiques from a variety of 
perspectives.  It is important to remember that even if the proposal were 
adopted, it is not a universal panacea.  Even with this system, the jury might 
not always be representative in any event.238  But negotiating peremptory 
challenges could quiet the noise surrounding Batson and enable us to focus 
on less visible, but wider-reaching, systemic reforms.  And negotiation 
would strike a fairer and more honest balance than the system criminal 
attorneys currently labor under. 
1. Doctrinal Objections 
Several objections could fairly be made to the proposal.  First, 
negotiation can be said to ignore the rights of the absent jurors, who may be 
excluded by agreement with no chance to rectify the injustice of their 
exclusion.  Second, a negotiated process might appear to lack legitimacy, as 
private ordering would replace decisions made in open court.  Finally, there 
is a concern that the expressive value of the Batson exercise will be lost.  
This Part answers all of these objections in turn. 
a. The Third-Party Doctrine Critique 
One objection to this proposal is that it fails to honor the rights of 
prospective jurors.  The concern that peremptory challenges may be used to 
exclude protected classes of jurors from democratic participation has 
become the animating principle of the Batson regime, displacing the 
interests of the defendant in retaining particular jurors.239  “Indeed, with the 
exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is 
their most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process,” 
observed the Court in Powers v. Ohio.240  Accordingly, the Court held that 
 
238 See supra notes 209–10 and accompanying text. 
239 Although the Batson Court had originally required that a defendant show that he is a 
member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor had used peremptory challenges 
to strike members of that group, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986), it had also 
acknowledged the rights of the excluded jurors.  As the Court observed, not only did racial 
discrimination in jury selection harm the accused, but it also harmed the excluded juror by 
“denying [him] participation in jury service on account of his race.”  Id. at 87. 
240 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407, 409 (1991) (holding that white defendant’s race did 
not affect his standing to raise the equal protection rights of excluded black jurors).  Batson, 
wrote Justice Anthony Kennedy, was designed to serve multiple ends, “only one of which was 
to protect individual defendants from discrimination in the selection of jurors.”  Id. at 406. 
50 CAREN MYERS MORRISON [Vol. 104 
litigants had third-party standing to raise the rights of excluded jurors, as 
the jurors were not in a position to object themselves.241 
Of course, the issue is less that jurors are unable to assert their rights 
than that they lack the desire to do so.  But while there may be no stampede 
to the courthouse by people demanding to be selected for jury service, much 
less prepared to sue about it,242 the right of every citizen to have the 
opportunity to sit on a jury is an important part of the democratic project.  
As Alschuler observed, if the rights of prospective jurors are violated by the 
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, what is at stake is “not only 
the opportunity to serve on juries (an opportunity that many of them would 
gladly decline) but also and more importantly their freedom from 
classification on invidious grounds.”243  And this is a right that is difficult to 
vindicate directly.  Even under our current, open-court Batson regime, 
jurors have no opportunity to voice their own objections.  “Although an 
unusually assertive juror might demand a hearing on the propriety of his or 
her exclusion, the predictable judicial response would be one of rejection—
probably one of astonished rejection.”244 
The concern raised by a system of negotiated strikes is that juror 
participation would depend on private parties’ acquiescence with little input 
from the court.  Without the Batson framework, the absent jurors might 
simply be forgotten, their rights only vindicated, if at all, as a byproduct of 
the parties’ self-interest as expressed through bargaining.  At first blush, 
this seems a compelling argument.  But the same can be said for the Batson 
regime itself.  While the doctrine holds that litigants are the proper party to 
 
241 While “[o]rdinarily, one may not claim standing in this Court to vindicate the 
constitutional rights of some third party,” Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953), a 
litigant may bring a claim on behalf of third parties so long as three conditions are met.  First, 
the third party must have suffered an “‘injury in fact,’” giving her “a ‘sufficiently concrete 
interest’ in the outcome of the issue in dispute.”  Powers, 499 U.S. at 411 (quoting Singleton v. 
Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112 (1976)).  Second, the litigant must have a “close relation to the third 
party,” and third, “there must exist some hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect his or 
her own interests.”  Id. (citing Singleton, 428 U.S. at 113–14, 115–16).  Despite the preference 
for allowing each party to raise its own claims, “[i]f there is some genuine obstacle to such 
assertion . . . the third party’s absence from court loses its tendency to suggest that his right is 
not truly at stake, or truly important to him, and the party who is in court becomes by default 
the right’s best available proponent.”  Singleton, 428 U.S. at 116. 
242 As the Court pointed out in Powers, it took nearly a century after the Civil Rights Act 
of 1875 for anyone to press a claim that he was being excluded from jury service in violation 
of equal protection.  See Powers, 499 U.S. at 414 (citing Carter v. Jury Comm’n of Greene 
Cnty., 396 U.S. 320, 320 (1970)). 
243 Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury, supra note 29, at 193. 
244 Id. at 194.  As Alschuler points out, a court is not going to allow a juror to “interrupt 
an ongoing criminal proceeding to demand a hearing simply because the juror’s own rights 
may have been violated.”  Id. 
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assert excluded jurors’ rights, a party will only bother to vindicate those 
rights if she believes it will be advantageous to her.  While bluntly put, the 
view of one defense lawyer that she felt “no obligation as an attorney to 
fight cultural stereotypes unless they are being used against my client, or to 
serve the interests of the broader community, unless this somehow also 
serves my client”245 is likely widely shared in the legal community.  If a 
litigant can be an effective defender of jurors’ rights, it is not because she 
particularly cares about those rights, but because it suits her purposes to 
defend them.  As Underwood astutely observed, third-party standing works 
in jury selection because it “harnesses private motivations to public 
purposes . . . [and] enlists the self-interest of litigants to protect the rights of 
the jurors and the public interest associated with those rights.”246  
Negotiation functions in exactly the same way. 
A litigant engaged in a private negotiation with her opponent will not 
be any less driven by self-interest than the same litigant simply conferring 
with her client or communing with her notes before deciding on her strikes.  
Negotiation is likely to do as good a job as the Batson framework on this 
score.  It may even do a better one, as the structure of negotiation makes 
refusal of the challenge the default with affirmative consent required for a 
strike’s exercise.247 
Of course, this does not directly answer the concerns of those who 
argue that leaving the selection of the jury in the hands of the litigants is 
antidemocratic—particularly if all the litigants are white.  Derrick Bell 
rejected proposals for affirmative selection on the basis that they 
disregarded the fact “that society has an interest in including members of 
minority groups independent of the desires of the parties in a particular 
case.”248  He advocated a statutory guarantee of racial representation 
(waivable by defendants) because he believed that “[t]he need for legitimate 
and participatory decision-making in criminal cases will not necessarily be 
served when the choice of jurors is left to the whim of litigants.”249  But that 
is the system we have.  My proposal simply provides a way to make 
litigants’ self-interest both more transparent and more effective. 
 
245 Smith, supra note 177, at 529–30. 
246 Underwood, supra note 52, at 759. 
247 See Zimmerman, supra note 222, at 1134 (describing how default rules affect 
decisionmaking because of status quo bias).  Zimmerman also notes how the status quo bias 
can be magnified by omission bias, which is an exaggerated preference for inaction.  See id. 
at 1135.  “Omission bias bolsters the status quo effect because a failure to act increases the 
persistence of the status quo.”  Id. 
248 BELL, supra note 107, §5.21 at 411–12. 
249 Id. at 412. 
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b. The Perception of Illegitimacy 
Another critique that can be leveled at the proposal is that private 
ordering by litigants of third parties’ constitutional rights lacks the 
expressive value of vindication in open court.  The negotiation process is 
off the record, secret, and may appear illegitimate, presenting the court with 
the results of the negotiation as a fait accompli. 
It is important to be clear about which part of the process would 
transfer to a private setting.  Voir dire of prospective jurors, arguments and 
rulings on challenges for cause, and excusing peremptorily challenged 
jurors would remain public.  Two moments would not be public: the 
decision of which jurors to strike and the challenges to either side’s strike 
preferences, which would be dealt with in negotiation rather than aired in 
open court.  The first moment is not controversial—the act of choosing who 
to strike has always been private.250  The second, however, diverges from 
current practice by replacing Batson challenges made in open court and 
ruled on by a judge with private negotiation.  Private negotiation would 
effectively obscure any disagreement or tension surrounding the decision 
over which jurors, if any, to strike.  Only a limited public moment would 
remain when the court decided whether to accept the parties’ joint decision. 
To the extent that the parties did not reach an agreement, there would 
be no peremptory challenges, only a jury constituted by random selection.  
The difficulty would arise when the parties did agree to certain strikes 
because private negotiation would replace the public “Batson moment.”  
But given the absolute veto power that negotiation affords each party, in 
practice, the Batson moment would not be replaced with silence but with 
visible outcomes.  To illustrate with a simple binary, a peremptory 
challenge by a party can be seen by her adversary as either objectionable or 
unobjectionable.  If unobjectionable (either on its own merits or in tandem 
with a countervailing strike), the adversary would have no reason to raise a 
Batson claim, because she would acquiesce in the strike.  If objectionable, 
the adversary, under the current system, would raise a Batson claim.  But 
under a negotiation system, the adversary would simply refuse to allow that 
strike.  There would be no Batson argument, but the outcome would be the 
same as a successful Batson challenge and its rejection of a particular 
peremptory strike.  To that extent, the results of the negotiation would be 
quite clear. 
 
250 That is the time when all lawyers review their notes, defense attorneys consult with their 
clients, and prosecutors consult with co-counsel or with law enforcement, and decide which 
jurors to strike and in which order.  The process is entirely private.  The judge does not attend 
these discussions; often a judge will declare a short recess or will simply give the parties a few 
minutes to decide on their challenges.  There is no record made of the discussions.  After the 
break is over, the parties return to the judge and usually take turns striking jurors. 
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c. Loss of Expressive Value 
If the aims of Batson are to protect jurors’ constitutional rights not to 
be discriminated against on invidious grounds, then its symbolic meaning is 
fully as important as its deterrent value.251  Moving the equal protection 
inquiry from public litigation in open court to an opaque system of private 
ordering provokes the critique that the proposal will result in a considerable 
loss of expressive value.  As a general matter, that may be true.  But it is 
worth stopping to ask whether the Batson moment really expresses anything 
worth saying.  Occasionally, to be sure, the public lesson of Batson will be 
clear.  A party will raise a claim, the proponent of the strike will be unable 
to defend it or will give a transparently false reason, and the judge will 
disallow the strike.  This effectively sends the message that racism will not 
be tolerated in the courts.  But far more often, the message devolves into 
something more hypocritical and demeaning. 
Most of the time, the Batson moment does little more than “bring[] to 
the surface and . . . ratify crude and unbecoming ways of classifying human 
beings.”252  Worse, it coopts the judge into the process.  Obliged to assess 
whether a party has made a prima facie case under Batson, judges puzzle 
over the numbers of nonwhite jurors and their proportion to white jurors.  
To justify their strikes, lawyers criticize jurors in terms of their family ties, 
their neighborhoods, their hairstyles, their demeanors, and other reasons so 
flimsy they seem like nothing more than a proxy for race.253  And since a 
Batson challenge cannot be made at all if the excluded juror is not a 
member of a cognizable group, lawyers wishing to raise a Batson claim 
may be forced into unseemly inquiries into the exact lineage of a 
prospective juror.254  As a result, our courts end up engaging in debates like 
this: 
 
251 See Covey, supra note 116, at 316 (arguing that Batson “symbolizes official 
intolerance of discrimination in jury selection”). 
252 Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury, supra note 29, at 201. 
253 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
254 See, e.g., United States v. Guerrero, 595 F.3d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 2010) (referencing a 
defense lawyer making a Batson challenge to the exclusion of a juror on the basis that she 
“looked like she may have some native American or Hispanic background”).  The district court 
judge in Guerrero denied the motion on the basis that he had not observed “anything unusual 
of her, and I don’t think she’s the type of person that would be subject to Batson challenge.”  
Id.  When the judge later saw that the juror had identified herself as “Native Hawaiian/Pacific 
Islander” on her jury questionnaire, he told counsel, “I didn’t pick up on the fact that she was a 
minority and subject to a Batson, but I have heard—somebody did say that she may have 
looked like she was.  And then I looked at the questionnaire, and I see that there was a 
connection to Hawaii.”  Id.  Other cases have provoked similar discussions.  See Johnson v. 
Campbell, 92 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996) (referencing debate between counsel and the court 
as to whether an excluded juror was in fact gay, with counsel arguing, “I listened to his 
answers.  I watched his mannerisms.  I believe him to be gay.”); People v. Barber, 245 Cal. 
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DEFENSE COUNSEL [after the prosecutor challenged a particular juror]: I’d like to 
question that choice, too, assuming she is black. 
PROSECUTOR: I don’t believe she is. 
THE COURT: It says Hispanic. 
PROSECUTOR: I think she is actually Indian.255 
None of this is particularly ennobling.  To the contrary, it appears to 
turn constitutional rights on “invidious, irrelevant inquiries.”256  But the 
issue goes beyond unseemliness.  Regardless of the individual abilities of 
any particular judge, the Judiciary as an institution is supposed to uphold 
the egalitarian ideal.  When a judge discharges her duty to that ideal by 
entertaining debates such as these or accepting reasons for strikes that are 
patently implausible and insulting, then the overriding message trivializes 
concerns about equality.  Instead, the Batson moment recirculates and 
ratifies the most reductionist possible view of race.  When the court and the 
litigants add up the total number of black jurors, when they calculate the 
proportion of strikes of black jurors as compared to strikes of white jurors, 
they are not considering those prospective jurors as individuals but almost 
as interchangeable units of blackness.  Not only is this not a constructive 
didactic moment, it may actually be a harmful one. 
In fact, our collective obsession with Batson may have obscured more 
systemic problems with underrepresentation in jury pools across the 
 
Rptr. 895, 895, 901 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (referencing debate over whether juror had a Hispanic 
surname with the judge concluding, “[T]hat lady could have been anything,” and denying the 
Batson challenge); Smith v. State, 59 So. 3d 1107, 1109 (Fla. 2011) (referencing discussion 
regarding whether juror was a member of a distinct minority group based on the fact that his 
surname sounded “like a German name”).  It is doubtful that any courts want to indulge in 
these kinds of debates.  See State v. Superior Court, 760 P.2d 541, 545 (Ariz. 1988) (noting the 
desirability of avoiding having trial judges and lawyers “be forced to inquire into the racial and 
ethnic makeup of particular jurors” because such a procedure would be “unseemly and 
intrusive”).  Yet the Batson framework encourages them. 
255 Windom v. State, 656 So. 2d 432, 436 (Fla. 1995).  In view of the uncertainty 
regarding the juror’s race, the court then decided to question the juror directly: 
THE COURT: Hi.  What is your nationality? 
JUROR: East Indian. 
THE COURT: Okay.  That’s all we need to know.  Thank you.  [To counsel:]  She is 
definitely not a recognized minority.  She’s East Indian. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Everybody in Trinidad is black. 
PROSECUTOR: Not everybody because she is, obviously, not. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: She may be Indian. 
THE COURT: All right.  She’s Indian but I’m going to let him strike her if that’s 
what he wants to do. 
Id. at 437. 
256 Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury, supra note 29, at 192 n.150. 
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nation.257  Because it is a drama played out in open court, Batson has the 
panache of courtroom derring-do—far more exciting than the mundane 
administrative tasks of compiling jury lists and mailing out jury 
summonses.  But it is in those mundane tasks where the roots of the 
problem lie.258  Just as mindfulness can help combat the effect of implicit 
biases, maybe if we can quiet the noise around Batson and relegate 
peremptory strikes to the realm of private ordering, we can finally address 
the deeper systemic problems that desperately need our attention. 
2. Practical Objections 
The proposal may also be subject to a number of practical objections.  
The first such objection is that the benefit would be one-sided, that if the 
Batson inquiry seems too easily twisted to the State’s advantage, this model 
is too easily swayed to the defense’s.  After all, in most jurisdictions, a 
unanimous jury is needed to convict, therefore all a defense lawyer needs 
for at least a partial victory for her client is one hold-out juror.259  If defense 
counsel can identify one such juror, she might refuse to negotiate, forcing 
the prosecution to go to trial with at least one juror who seems like a real 
risk.  Nonetheless, this concern may be overblown.  Empirical evidence 
based both on real juries and on mock jury studies indicates that, Twelve 
 
257 As a very broad comparison, a September 2013 Westlaw search of law reviews citing 
the lead case on the composition of the jury venire, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 
(1975), decided eleven years before Batson, turned up 1,113 articles.  By contrast, a Westlaw 
search of law review articles citing Batson revealed 2,735 articles. 
258 In Taylor v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court held that because the Sixth Amendment 
imposes a fair cross-section requirement on the jury venire, “petit juries must be drawn from a 
source fairly representative of the community.”  419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975).  But in assembling 
the lists from which jury venires will be selected, each state uses a variety of sources that can 
limit the pool of prospective jurors.  See Trial Juries: Size and Verdict Rules, supra note 24, at 
tbls.48b & c.  Sources that potential jurors are pulled from include driver’s license databases, 
motor vehicle registration, utility rolls, voter registration, non-driver ID cards, and tax rolls—
sources that hardly represent the full scope of the community.  See id. at tbl.48b (providing data 
showing that as of September 26, 2013, out of the fifty states, twenty-nine require a driver’s 
license, twenty-nine require voter registration, and twenty-four require both).  Furthermore, the 
initial pool of jurors is further diminished by various eligibility requirements, such as a 
minimum residency period and a minimum age, or the disqualification of convicted felons and 
non-English speaking people.  See id. at tbl.48c.  Six states, however, do not bar convicted 
felons from jury duty (Colorado, Illinois, Maine, Mississippi, New Mexico, and Wisconsin) 
and eight states do not require the juror to speak English (Georgia, Maine, Montana, New 
Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas).  Id.  Finally, many jurors simply do not 
respond to summonses, narrowing the pool even further. 
259 All jurisdictions except for Oregon and Puerto Rico require a unanimous jury verdict.  
See ROTTMAN & STRICKLAND, supra note 23, at 233–37 tbl.42.  Louisiana only requires 
unanimity for capital cases and those where the mandatory penalty is confinement at hard 
labor.  Id. at 234, 236 n.20. 
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Angry Men notwithstanding, a single juror will not often hang the jury.260  
Many scenarios can be imagined where the proposal could result in a net 
disadvantage to one side or the other, depending on which twelve jurors end 
up on the initial panel.  But this risk is no greater than what both parties 
would face if peremptory challenges were abolished. 
The flip side of this argument is that this proposal would benefit the 
prosecution and disadvantage the defense by taking away the built-in 
advantage in some jurisdictions, which allow the defense more peremptory 
challenges than the prosecutor.261  The negotiation system, by giving the 
parties equal bargaining power, removes this slight advantage in those 
jurisdictions.  Nonetheless, the power to prevent the prosecutor from 
eliminating any defense-friendly prospective jurors by simple veto may 
more than offset this cost. 
Second, the negotiated consent model is vulnerable to collusion, 
should the parties agree to exclude a particular class of jurors because it 
furthers their own ends.  Historically, collusion to exclude African-
Americans was a serious problem, particularly in the South.262  However, 
this issue appears to have subsided.  And while this proposal does not do 
much to combat this problem, neither does Batson.  Currently, parties who 
collude to exclude a certain segment of the population from their jury need 
only refrain from making Batson objections to each other’s strikes, and the 
courts only rarely exercise their authority to raise Batson issues sua 
sponte.263  Under a negotiation system, the court should retain the ability to 
 
260 See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 106–07 tbl.6.3 (1983) (showing that, in 
mock jury study, a single holdout juror would change her vote and side with the majority 
over 75% of the time); see also HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 
462 (1966) (observing that “juries which begin with an overwhelming majority in either 
direction are not likely to hang” and that “[i]t requires a massive minority of 4 or 5 jurors at 
the first vote to develop the likelihood of a hung jury”).  But see Valerie P. Hans, 
Deliberation and Dissent: 12 Angry Men Versus the Empirical Reality of Juries, 82 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 579, 584–85 (2007) (noting that dissenters occasionally prevail). 
261 In federal court, and in a number of states, the defense is allotted more peremptory 
strikes than the prosecution.  See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)(2) (in noncapital felony cases, 
the “government has 6 peremptory challenges and the defendant or defendants jointly have 
10 peremptory challenges”); MD. R. CRIM. P. 4-313(a)(2) (in cases involving a penalty of 
death or life imprisonment, the defendant is generally allowed twenty peremptory challenges 
and the state ten); W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)(1)(A) (in felony cases, defendants are allowed 
six peremptory challenges and the state two). 
262 In Swain v. Alabama, the Court described several occurrences where prosecution and 
defense counsel agreed to exclude black jurors.  See 380 U.S. 202, 224–25 (1965) (“Apparently 
in some cases, the prosecution agreed with the defense to remove Negroes.”).  In another 
instance, “the prosecution offered the defendant an all-Negro jury but the defendant in that case 
did not want a jury with any Negro members.  There was other testimony that in many cases 
the Negro defendant preferred an all-white to a mixed jury.”  Id. at 225. 
263 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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question any joint strikes as violating equal protection and disallow them if 
unsatisfied upon further inquiry.  This would not be an improvement on 
current practice, but in those rare situations where the court mistrusts the 
parties and is concerned that there might be collusion to the detriment of the 
defendant or the excluded jurors, the court should at least have the same 
flexibility it had under Batson. 
Third, the proposal would sharply limit an occasionally viable 
appellate avenue for defendants.  While Batson issues are not often winners 
on appeal,264 a successful appellate claim of a Batson violation will result in 
automatic reversal—not an inconsequential benefit to a convicted 
defendant.  Nonetheless, it surely would be better not to have the defendant 
convicted by an illegally selected jury in the first place. 
Finally, it may be difficult to convince litigants and courts to adopt this 
proposal, as lawyers take a notoriously dim view of change.  But for courts 
seeking an alternative to Batson, negotiation presents some inherent 
advantages.  There would be no complicated rules to learn, no unfamiliar 
strategies, no arcane skills needed.  For attorneys, it would just be a 
question of sitting down with their opponents and seeing if they could agree 
on any strikes.  If not, they would turn their attention to their opening 
statements.  Negotiation would not overwhelmingly advantage either side.  
It would not undermine the dignity of the participants or the court.  Most of 
all, negotiation would offer a better chance of achieving more 
representative juries. 
It is simply not true to say that our system is working.  Negotiating 
peremptory challenges may not be a perfect solution, but no one procedure 
will achieve optimal results in every situation.  There may be cases of 
collusion.  There may be cases in which a lawyer does a very poor job 
safeguarding his client’s interests.  But it is not at all clear that those clients 
would have fared any better under the Batson scenario.  In the end, we are 
flawed people living in an imperfect world.  But “even if implicit biases 
themselves cannot change, the causal link between biases and behavior can 
be disrupted through procedural and structural reforms.”265  That is what 
this proposal hopes to achieve. 
CONCLUSION 
The system of peremptory challenges we currently employ does not 
work.  The Batson framework may curb some racial discrimination, but not 
 
264 See, e.g., State v. Saintcalle, No. 86257-5, slip op. at 13 (Wash. Aug. 1, 2013) (“In 
over 40 cases since Batson, Washington appellate courts have never reversed a conviction 
based on a trial court’s erroneous denial of a Batson challenge.” (citation omitted)). 
265 Kang & Lane, supra note 8, at 511. 
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all, and probably not even most.  The requirement that questioned 
challenges must be explained leads to dishonesty and does little to 
encourage attorneys to understand their motives.  Allowing the parties to 
negotiate their peremptory challenges with each other offers a way out that 
is equitable, simple, and considerably more effective at curbing improper 
uses of the challenge.  While adopting a system of negotiating peremptory 
challenges would require a reevaluation of the methods we are accustomed 
to, that reevaluation is long overdue.  
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